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Disenrollment Patterns of Elderly in Managed Care
and Fee for Service
Kenneth G. Manton,* H. Dennis Tolley,t Robert Newcomer,*
James C. Vertrees,§ and Charlene Harrington~

Abstract
As the trend to provide health care through managed care facilities increases, the need to examine ,vhy insured individuals voluntarily terminate
managed care coverage grows. Voluntary termination of coverage, or dis enrollment, has both social and fiscal implications. Particularly among the elderly,
patterns of disenrollment likely are related to self assessment of care needs
and levels of health. In this paper we examine the patterns of dis enrollment
among elderly enrollees as a function of health status and disability. We focus
on disenrollment patterns from an experimental prepaid extended care facility, called a social HMO (S/HMO) and compare this pattern with dis enrollment
*Kenneth G. Manton, Ph.D., is Research Professor and Research Director of Demographic Studies at Duke University, and lVfedical Research Professor at Duke University
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within a sample of HMO enrollees and with a fee for service sample. The analysis is based on a frailty index defined using a fuzzy set model. The results
indicate that bias in the enrollment process is exacerbated by disenrollment
patterns that depend on the level of frailty and disability. Those with a greater
degree of disability and chronic illness tend to disenroll into the fee for service
coverage. Healthier persons, on the other hand, have a lower likelihood of disenrollment. This suggests that managed care is not providing for the needs of
the patients most in need of care.
Key words and phrases: fuzzy set, health care, health maintenance organization (HMO), Medicare

1

Introduction

This paper presents an analysis of patterns of voluntary termination
of coverage among individuals enrolled in an experimental managed
care environment and compares these patterns with those enrolled in
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and those covered under fee
for service (FFS). Voluntary termination of coverage, or dis enrollment,
can result in fortuitous gains or unexpected losses if those disenrolling
are more or less healthy and/or disabled than the average of those covered. Differential likelihood of dis enrollment for individuals with differing levels of disability and health care need is considered a prime
cause of deterioration in the claims experience for individual and small
group coverages. The effects of differential dis enrollment among the
enrollees of a managed care provider also can be significant. Although
methods of formally recognizing and reserving for differential dis enrollment are not widespread, the trends toward increasing the role of
managed care makes understanding the effects of dis enrollment on the
profile of the enrollees essential.
It has been proposed that a major cause of dis enrollment under individual health coverage is the individual's ability to assess his or her
own probability of making a claim. Those insureds who feel a greater
degree of impairment, as measured by their own personal index, are
thought to remain with a coverage plan, while those who feel little or
no impairment will shop around for cheaper coverage or more extensive
coverage for the same price (Bluhm, 1982). Under this model of personal optimization, claims experience deteriorates over and above any
attenuation in the selection effect as the block of business matures and
over any effect due to aging of the individuals covered. Many feel that
accepting this model entails setting up a premium reserving system in
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an effort to be equitable to the insureds. With no premium reserve, the
model predicts increases in the net premium in excess of the increased
costs due to aging and selection effects.
The fact that benefit selection can result in increased costs to the
insurer is well identified in the literature. l Choice is also often present
among those seeking coverage through an HMO or other managed care
provider, whether they are seeking coverage as indiViduals, under a
group arrangement by a large employer, or as a postretirement beneficiaries. Levels of satisfaction of care received from a managed care
provider often are determined by convenience, accessibility, and quality of care. Personal satisfaction, level of insurance protection, and access to alternatives seem to playa primary role in decisions to change
the type of coverage or the provider of coverage (Rossiter et al., 1989).
Thus, individual choice may have an antiselection effect on managed
care plans.
Several studies have found that enrollees who are classified as sicker
than average also have a higher likelihood of dis enrolling from HMO
coverage (Brown, 1988; Tucker and Langwell, 1989). Such a pattern effectively provides an ongoing selection process among the enrolled, returning those requiring more care to FFS coverage. The principal causes
of dis enrollment from HMO coverage identified by these researchers
are concern about physician competency, ability to maintain continuity
of care, and inconvenience. In studies of the elderly, those Medicare
clients switching plans from one HMO to another are found to be in
better health than those returning to FFS coverage. The prime motivations for switching from one HMO provider to another are convenience
and premium rates, motivations similar to those posited for switching
FFS coverages in Bluhm's individual coverage model. (See also Pascoe,
1983 and Zastowny et al., 1983.)
In 1985 the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) began a
demonstration of SOCial/health maintenance organizations (SjHMOs).2
The demonstration project consisted of four SjHMOs that would provide managed care for the elderly, offering both standard Medicare benefits (e.g., hospital and physician) and expanded Medicare benefits such
as drugs, hearing aids, and glasses. Three sites offered dental benefits,
though these were reduced or eliminated by 1987 due to high use. Thus,
for most members, SjHMOs are high option HMOs offering basic and
expanded benefits. Unique to SjHMOs is long-term care coverage (e.g.,
1 See Fuhrer and Shapiro (1992) for illustrations and references.
2Elderplan and SCAN Health Plan were started by long-term care providers. Seniors
Plus (Group Health and the Ebenezer Society) and Medicare Plus-II (Northwest KaiserPermanente) were high option plans in established HMOs (Newcomer et al., 1991).
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nursing home care, homemaker care, and respite care) limited to $6,500
to $12,000 per annum (depending on the plan) for those who meet their
state's Medicaid criteria for nursing home care. Because of the concern
about adverse selection, SjHMOs were required by HCFA to screen applicants for health. Enrollment was designed to limit the number of
enrollees initially qualifying for nursing home care to 5 percent. This
resulted in a number of nursing home care applicants being placed on a
waiting list for subsequent enrollment. Limiting the enrollment so that
only 5 percent of individuals enrolled qualified for nursing home care
combined with marketing and the perceived filtering effect of a required
health assessment produced a healthier membership (Newcomer et al.,
1990).
Harrington et al. (1991) and Newcomer et al. (1990, 1991) examine
client satisfaction and its effect on SjHMO disenrollment. Previous research on staff and group Medicare HMOs has found that dis enrollment
reinforces favorable enrollment bias to give the HMO an increasing advantage over FFS relative to health of the enrolled (Brown, 1988). In this
paper we examine whether dis enrollment reinforces or counteracts the
initial enrollment bias in the SjHMO. Samples of FFS and HMO members
in the same locale were drawn at the beginning of the demonstration.
All members in the SjHMO, FFS, and HMO samples were followed for
three years. The experiences of these three samples are compared here
to examine dis enrollment patterns associated with costs prior to, and
health at, enrollment.
To assess the degree to which dis enrollment patterns are functions
of poor health or disability, we generate a measure of case mix using
the health and disability information obtained at enrollment. Because
this information contains many variables, we summarize health and
disability status into six sets. The health and disability status of each
individual are indexed by a fuzzy grade of membership score 3 with
respect to each of these six sets (Manton, Woodbury, and Tolley 1994).
3Later on we will describe how these scores can be generated from the data obtained
at enrollment. Actuaries can apply this method, provided the same assessment information described below is obtained for each individual enrolled. The overall pattern
of the grade of membership scores block defines the case mix of the block.
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Description of Samples Studied
Locations

The samples used in this paper consist of elderly (65 years and older)
Medicare-eligible members from three different types of coverage: (i)
S/HMO; (ii) TEFRA4 HMO; and (iii) Medicare beneficiaries receiving care
under FFS. The plans were in four communities:
• Elderplan (Brooklyn, New York);
• SCAN Health Plan (Long Beach, California);
• SeniorPlus (Minneapolis, Minnesota); and
• Medicare Plus-II (Portland, Oregon).
Because the Brooklyn site initially had no TEFRA HMOs, there are 11
different samples. The number of individuals in each sample is given
in Table 1. The sample design covers certain age groups to ensure adequate power in forming certain statistical tests. The design effect resulting from this sampling has been removed in the analyses presented
here, however, by conditioning on case mix. Because S/HMO clients
voluntarily enrolled and were not randomly selected, individual health
differences are statistically adjusted. 5
Two constraints to enrollment implicitly operating are competition
from other locations and relative cost of care. Brooklyn and Portland
were relatively new areas for HMO enrollment of the elderly, with 7
percent and 16 percent of the elderly, respectively, enrolled in some
HMO at the beginning of the project. Long Beach and Minneapolis were
more established, with 24 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of the
elderly enrolled. Competition had a negative impact on the ability of
the S/HMOs to enroll members quickly. The primary consideration in
setting initial premium levels was to be competitive with existing HMO
4The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) allows HMOs the option of
providing health care to Medicare beneficiaries under a prepaid contract. In order for
the HMO to have a population of interest to sample for comparison with S/HMO, the
HMO had to be a operating under the prepaid (or at risk) option of TEFRA.
5To test if case mix represents health factors affecting enrollment, we examine mortality differences between FFS and S/HMO after case mix adjustment. Most differences
are explained. Remaining differences due to unmeasured attributes (e.g., market, access, economic and consumption variables) are controlled by using site as a variable.
Surveys (Le., consumer chOice, plan satisfaction and dis enrollment) describe marketing
and individual preferences (Newcomer et aI., 1990; Harrington et aI., 1991; Newcomer
et aI., 1991).
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Table 1
Sample Design and Sample Sizes
SjHMO Demonstration Project
Type of Provider
Location
Brooklyn
Long Beach
Minneapolis
Portland
TOTAL

SjHMO
2,680
1,919
1,720
4,517
10,836

FFS
3,408
3,556
2,934
6,761
16,659

HMO
1,000
1,000
1,000
3,000

options in each of the areas. Premiums were less than those of competing Medicare supplemental policies, but greater than HMO Medicare
alternatives (Harrington and Newcomer, 1991). Despite the intent to
keep the SjHMOs competitive, relative cost differences are present.
SCAN Health Plan, for example, had premiums of approximately $25
per month compared to HMO premiums of zero. Medicare Plus-II had
higher premiums than other HMOs in Portland, but appeared to have
little problem with enrollment or with increases in premium rates.

2.2

Health Assessment

To assess health and disability level, information on 31 items is obtained at the time of enrollment using the health screening form (HSF)
based on the national long-term care survey (NLTCS) screening instrument (Durako, 1987). This instrument measures three areas:
• Activities of daily living (ADLs) such as toileting, dreSSing, and
bathing (Katz and Akpom, 1976);
• Instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) such as preparing
meals, laundry, housework (Lawton and Brody, 1969); and
• Medical conditions such as diabetes, hypertension, etc.
A brief description of these three areas is given in column 1 of Table 2.
When applying for membership in the SjHMO, individuals were required to complete the health screening forms. This was done usually
by mail. If some responses were inadequate, SjHMO staff followed up
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by telephone. Consequently, health screens are available for 98.3 percent of S/HMO enrollees. 6 For members in FFS samples, health screening forms were done by phone. In either group, if impairments are reported on two or more instrumental activities of daily living or on one
or more activities of daily living, a detailed assessment is conducted to
confirm impairment. The health screening form response rate is 80.5
percent in FFS and 85.7 percent in HMOs. The response rates do not
include 20.3 percent of the FFS and 4.5 percent of the HMO members
in samples who were found to be institutionalized or dead (in Medicare
files). FFS sample members not located are included in the response
rate calculations.
Not all variables associated with health are contained in this list
of 31 items. To test for the adequacy of the 31 items as a measure
of health, we examine the ability of the health scores generated from
these 31 variables to explain mortality. Scores explain most differences
between S/HMOs and FFS, suggesting little effect of unobserved health
variables (Manton et al., 1994). We also examine site differences in prior
costs, mortality, and dis enrollment between S/HMO, FFS, and HMO. Differences not related to case mix suggest the influence of unobserved
nonhealth variables, such as psychological, market, and economic factors. Consequently, all analyses presented here are adjusted using site,
plan type, and living arrangement variables.

2.3

Prior Use and Expenditures

Medicare Part A and B data are drawn from the Medicare Automated
Data Retrieval System (MADRS) for all plans. National file searches
are made to locate persons spending part of the time outside a site.
Medicare costs (for those 65 and older) in the 12 months prior to being interviewed are determined for FFS sample members (whether or
not responding to the health screening form). For individuals who are
members of a managed care plan, Medicare costs prior to enrollment
are not available. These individuals are not used in any analyses involving prior costs. There are some individuals who had some prior health
care cost data but not for the complete 12 months preceding the study.
Generally such individuals had previous cost data covering more than
180 days. For these individuals the data available are used to calculate
a per diem rate which is inflated to 12 months.
6No health assessment was made at the time the individual terminated SjHMO or
HMO coverage. There was a satisfaction questionnaire, however administered at termination. The results of the analysis of the satisfaction data are given in Newcomer et
al. (1991).
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Nonresponse Bias

Although the nonresponse rate for SjHMO enrollees on the health
screening form is low (less than 2 percent), the nonresponse rates for
the health screening form among the FFS sample and HMO sample range
from 14 percent to 20 percent. Such a high nonresponse rate may bias
measures of prior cost and function, because elderly survey nonrespondents tend to be frail (e.g., Manton et al., 1991). To examine the potential bias we use average Medicare cost of the populations at each site
and compare these with the average Medicare cost for the sample populations. Average Medicare costs per utilizer in the site populations
($3,449; $3,139 excluding nursing home residents) are higher than in
FFS samples.
We had complete Medicare utilization data for the six counties in
the catchment area of the four SjHMOs. These data indicate that 64
percent of eligible persons annually use Medicare-covered services. Applying this 64 percent figure to the per capita cost estimate in the site
populations yields $2,009 per annum per eligible person or 15.2 percent higher than in the samples ($1,746) reported here. The bias is in
the direction and of the size (15 percent) found in studies of survey
nonresponse (Manton et al., 1991; NCHS, 1964). Two year prior average
annual costs in the National Medicare HMO Demonstration are $1,102 in
HMOs and $1,682 in FFS (Rossiter et al., 1989). Prior costs in SjHMOs
($1,316) are 19.4 percent higher than in those HMOs. Costs for the
SjHMO FFS sample are only 4 percent higher than the FFS samples in
the National Medicare HMO Demonstration. Because FFS sample costs
are lower than for FFS site populations, the nonresponse bias in the FFS
sample is against demonstrating favorable enrollment in SjHMOs.

3 Heterogeneity and Case Mix
Dahl (1991) shows that for individual health coverages the effects
of rerating, aging of the insured, and antiselection are perfectly confounded without some measure of health and disability on both the
continuing insured and those terminating coverage. By perfectly confounded we mean that observed increases in utilization and per capita
cost could be generated by changes in premium, aging, or antiselection or by any combination of these in such a way that there is no way
to quantitatively determine the sources of these increases. Because of
such confounding, it is impossible to determine which of these sources
is the cause of claims deterioration. Separating the effects of aging of
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the members, function, and mortality on choice of provider type for
managed care also requires a measure of health and disability. Such
a measure must go beyond the standard AAPCC underwriting factors
(i.e., age, gender, welfare and institutional status) because these predict
less than 1 percent of the individual costs (e.g., Lubitz et al., 1985).
The health screening form assessment provides a basis for developing such a measure. A 31 dimensional index, however, is difficult
to implement. As noted in the recent actuarial literature (e.g., Young,
1993), when classification risks for a collection of individuals are to be
reduced to a few actuarially viable components, the methods of fuzzy
sets are useful. These methods allow the reduction of highly multidimensional data to a few fuzzy sets.7 Each individual is classified as
a fuzzy member of these sets using grade of membership scores (Ostaszewski,1993).
A small number of meaningful sets can be determined using a qualitative assessment of past experience or can be generated from the data
using computational procedures such as maximum likelihood (Manton,
Woodbury, and Tolley, 1994). In either case, the sets should represent
a reasonable separation of risks. 8 Each individual in the 11 samples is
given a grade of membership (GoM) score indicating the degree to which
the person is a member of each of these sets. Thus, each of these sets
is fuzzy in that the degree to which any individual is a member of any
set can vary between 0 (not a member) to 1 (a complete member).
The grade of membership scores are estimated from the data contained on the health screening forms. We denote the grade of membership score for individual i for the kth fuzzy set as Bik with
K

L Bik =

1,

0:::; Bik :::; l.

(1)

k=l

Let f.kj denote the probability of individual i giving a positive response
to question j for an given that i is a complete member of set k, i.e.,
7Estimation of the fuzzy set structure resembles discrete factor analysis in that the
statistical procedure looks for a few explanatory characteristics. (See, for example,
Dillon and Goldstein (1984, Chapter 3) for more on factor analysis.) Usually these
characteristics are described by a few dimensions of the data space. These characteristics describe sets of individuals. Unlike factor analysis, however, the fuzzy set method
does not require each individual to be a crisp member of these sets, but the individual may be a partial member of several sets. Note that a crisp member is a complete
member of member of a set in the classical sense. In the classical definition of sets, an
element is either a member of a set or not a member of the set.
BEy reasonable separation of risks we mean that the sets need to be more than simply
a statistical construct. They should have meaning as regards to level of health, health
care need, utilization, mortality risk, and so forth.
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who has (Bik = 1). The probability that i gives a positive response to
question j is (Woodbury and Clive, 1974):
K

Pij =

L BikAkj,

(2)

k=l

where K is the number of fuzzy sets.
The probability, Pij, can be viewed as a binomial probability for
questionj. As shown by Suppes and Zanotti (1981), there exists a vector
of parameters Ajkl ;:: 0 and a set of grade membership scores, Bib for
each individual, i, such that the likelihood 9 is given by:

L =

where
..
YIJI

=

AjkO

~~

JJ
1

(K

k~l BikAjkl

)YiJ

1

,

(3)

+ Ajkl = 1, YijO + Yijl = 1 and

{I if individual i gives a positive response to question j; and
0 otherwise.

We choose estimates of both the BikS and the AkjlS that maximize this
likelihood (Manton, Woodbury, and Tolley, 1994). Comparing equations
(2) and (3) we see that Ajk = Ajkl.
The data indicate that there are six fuzzy groups. These six groups
are defined in the listing below. They represent different classifications
of healthy, disabled, and frail. A regression formula for calculating
these scores for any particular health screening form response profile
is given in Table 3. 10
Group 1 = Healthy: Means free of medical problems and impairments,
young (average age 71 years), often male, married, uses few services, and has low mortality. Such persons may see little benefit
to S/HMO long-term care benefits if premiums are high.
9This likelihood is similar to that produced by the product binomial model. When
there are more levels of responses than just the two considered here. the model becomes the product multinomial likelihood with different levels of each multinomial
indexed by the I subscript of y.
IOThe grade of membership for each set for an individual is obtained by adding the
entries in the relevant columns in Table 3 for each of the 31 characteristics present
in the individual. This will give six different totals. Negative totals are adjusted to be
zero. The totals then are standardized to l. These standardized totals are the grade
of membership scores for the individual.
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Group 2 = Acutely Ill: Has multiple medical conditions (e.g., 56 percent have cancer) but little impairment. It is similar in age to
Group 1 (average age 72.2 years) and likely married and male.
Group 2 used the most acute care in the prior year (e.g., hospitalization) with mortality higher than Group 1 but lower than
Groups 3, 4, and 6. If HMOs provide the most effective acute care,
this group may prefer HMOs over S/HMOs. The phrase acutely ill
emphasizes differences between groups, i.e., some conditions in
Group 2 persist and produce intermittent or terminal disability
(e.g., cancer); others are severe and rapidly progress to death (or
recovery).
Group 3 = IADL Impaired: Has instrumental activities of daily liVing,
mobility, and neurological impairment. The instrumental activities of daily living [money management, telephoning, medications
(Manton and Soldo, 1985)] suggest this group is cognitively impaired. This group is older (average age 78.8 years), dependent,
uses long-term care, and has high mortality. Because of its longterm care needs, it may be retained by S/HMOs.
Group 4 = Chronic Circulatory: Has diabetes, hypertension, atherosclerosis, and stroke but no cancer or heart trouble. It is old (average
age 81.1 years) and female with higher mortality than Group 2.
Given high acute care needs, persons in this group may dis enroll
from S/HMOs or HMO to FFS.
Group 5 = Older Healthy: Is functional, but has joint problems. It is
older than Group 1 (76.2 years) and more female. It has the second
highest marital rate. Service use is low, and mortality is similar to
Group 1. This group may disenroll to FFS or HMO.
Group 6 = Frail: Has multiple co-morbidities and impairments. It uses
the most acute and long-term care services, is old (89 years), and
has the highest mortality. Because of its long-term care needs, it
may be retained by S/HMOs.
The pure type, or complete member, of any of these six fuzzy sets
is characterized by the probabilities of responses on each of the 31
items in the health screening form. The values of i\kjl provide a profile
describing the attributes associated with each of the groups. These
profiles are in Table 2. For example, 100 percent of the individuals
completely in either fuzzy set 3 or fuzzy set 6 will need help preparing
meals. None of the individuals completely in the other fuzzy sets will
need help with this task.

,....
00

N

Table 2
Parameter Values A jkl Estimated for 31 Health and Functioning Measures
for Four Social/Health Maintenance Organization Demonstration Projects 1984-1989

A jkl x 100

Needs Help With:
1. Preparing meals
2. Laundry
3. Light housework
4. Grocery shopping
5. Managing money
6. Taking medicine
7. Making phone calls
8. Eating
9. Getting in/out of chairs or bed
10. Walking around inside
11. Driving/using public transportation
12. Toileting
13. Dressing
14. Bathing
15. Uses a wheelchair
16. Uses a walker
17. Uses a cane
18. Is bedfast

Freq (%)

(1)

(2)

7.6
9.8
9.4
13.3
6.8
4.9
4.4
0.9
2.3
4.0
14.3
1.7
2.6
4.2
2.9
3.9
11.3
1.4

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
96.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
48.5
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
87.8
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
98.9
71.1
41.7
40.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.7
68.8
47.4

"-

0

Notes: Freq = Population Frequency; (1) = Healthy; (2) = Acutely Ill; (3) = Impaired; (4) = Chronically Ill; (5) = Older
Healthy; and (6) = Frail.
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Table 2 (cont.)

:l

Parameter Values Ajkl Estimated for 31 Health and Functioning Measures

....

for Four Social/Health Maintenance Organization Demonstration Projects 1984-1989

~

A jkl

X

(D

o

100

'"
:l
(D

Freq (%)
Medical Conditions
19. Diabetes Mellitus
20. Hypertension
21. Heart trouble
22. Neurological problems
23. Stroke
24. Lung or breathing problems
25. Chronic cough
26. Cancer
27. Hardening of the arteries
28. Stomach/bowel problems
29. Bladder problems
30. Rheumatism or Arthritis
31. Other health problems

(1)

8.9
37.1
21.1
7.0
4.2
13.0
6.2
4.0
16.7
17.4
ll.S
52.1
21.0

Weight Prevalence

Notes: Freq = Population Frequency; (1)
Healthy; and (6) = Frail.
1
Weight Prevalence =

-

I

I

l. g ik

=

Healthy; (2)

=

(2)

(3)

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
56.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
0.0

44.7

11.3

Acutely Ill; (3)

=

(4)

0.0
0.0
0.0
73.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
27.3
9.1
Impaired; (4)

=

(5)

(6)

100.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
30.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0

10.5
0.0
34.4
37.8
66.5
14.6
3.4
7.5
74.1
65.8
67.2
100.0
50.1

11.9

lS.9

4.1

Chronically Ill; (5)

=

-.
o
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Table 3
Regression Coefficients for Grade of Membership Scores for Each Fuzzy Set.
Responses From the Health Screening Form Assessment
(Values Standardized to Sum to Unity)

Reg. Variable
Intercep
Prepmeal
Laundry
Housework
Grocshop
Manmoney
TakeMeds
Phone
Eat
Getinout
Walkinsi
Travel
Toilet
Dress
Bathe
Diabetes
Hyprtent
HeartTro
Neurocom
Strokshm

K=l

K=2

K=3

K=4

K=5

K=6

0.289692
-0.218351
-0.054227
-0.024242
-0.129651
-0.022644
0.068975
0.005079
0.118764
0.000304
-0.150372
-0.128237
0.097242
0.002352
-0.002614
0.007040
-0.098511
0.079626
-0.031191
-0.013295

0.298944
0.021623
-0.009097
0.004899
-0.014232
-0.005768
-0.022808
0.001174
0.125928
0.001282
0.046225
-0.000714
-0.000401
-0.021699
-0.032714
-0.049095
-0.016627
-0.105630
0.074705
0.079024

0.152671
0.111356
0.066951
0.080811
0.055990
0.114757
0.048879
0.076400
-0.135862
-0.102795
-0.054573
0.043889
-0.124278
-0.057029
-0.050598
0.006535
0.004660
0.000703
-0.048456
-0.050048

0.144529
-0.014032
0.002101
-0.027868
0.111429
-0.060307
-0.060066
-0.042793
-0.004571
-0.005648
-0.016254
0.130489
-0.014610
-0.014573
0.001058
0.007652
-0.020715
0.005596
-0.011831
-0.042608

0.081982
-0.024097
-0.019452
-0.029617
-0.018410
-0.008998
-0.030088
0.009573
0.030091
0.006355
0.130158
-0.035331
-0.027394
-0.002557
-0.030534
0.024065
0.127511
0.021165
0.035221
0.030193

0.032183
0.123501
0.013724
-0.003983
-0.005125
-0.017040
-0.004892
-0.049433
-0.134350
0.100502
0.044816
-0.010097
0.069439
0.093506
0.115403
0.003803
0.003682
-0.001460
-0.018448
-0.003267

Notes: Reg. Variable = Regression Variable

f-'

00
~

'--

0

c
....,
::::>
~
0
.....,

»
t"\

M-

c

$l.I
....,

-$l.I
""0
....,
$l.I
t"\

M-

t"\

_ro

<
0

-z
N

~

-

N
~

\D
\D

~

:s::

III
::::l

.....
0

::::l
(l)
.....

Table 3 (cont.)
Regression Coefficients for Grade of Membership Scores for Each Fuzzy Set.
Responses From the Health Screening Form Assessment
(Values Standardized to Sum to Unity)
Reg. Variable
Lungprob
Chchough
Cancer
Circprob
Stombowl
Urinprob
Rheum
Othrhlth
Wheelcha
Walker
Cane
Bedfast

K=l

K=2

K=3

K=4

K=5

K=6

0.069886
-0.021299
-0.087591
0.079016
0.085451
0.040365
0.107036
0.301930
-0.022655
-0.032638
0.134663
-0.095239

-0.096427
-0.039337
0.024720
-0.063062
-0.097491
-0.069146
-0.019814
0.001910
0.040403
0.050688
0.014294
0.167366

0.001286
-0.002120
0.001723
0.006610
0.003616
0.006774
0.022714
0.003473
-0.050348
0.006774
-0.008748
-0.060080

0.012580
0.016927
0.014896
-0.029049
0.010906
0.013648
-0.024747
0.000485
0.051972
0.022476
-0.166583
0.028062

0.011855
0.037001
0.035232
0.012688
0.006414
0.019773
-0.078665
-0.306481
0.014341
0.013698
0.014227
0.035397

0.000820
0.008828
0.011020
-0.006203
-0.008897
-0.011414
-0.006523
-0.001317
-0.033712
-0.061000
0.012146
-0.075506

~

0
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(l)
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Notes: Reg. Variable = Regression Variable
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Also considering use of a cane (item 17), the percentages of individuals completely in each of the six groups with this characteristic are,
respectively, 9 percent, 9 percent, 48.5 percent, 87.8 percent, 0 percent,
and 68.8 percent. Recall that these are theoretical individuals. There
may be few, if any, individuals who are complete members (i.e., have
scores of 100 percent) of any specific fuzzy set. The likelihood of a person being a complete member decreases as the number of items used
to describe persons increases.
The grade of membership scores for each individual determine the
degree to which the individual may be classified into each of the six
sets. These grade of membership scores reflect the level of frailty and
disability of each individual and are used to define a case mix. They
also may be treated as a type of regression variable with regard to a
response of interest. In particular, we are interested in the probability
of changing coverage as a function of the level of disability and frailty.
Because the Bik score for each individual is a surrogate for the probability of changing coverage, a model for the probability of change should
be based on these. For a complete member of the kth fuzzy set let AkT
denote the probability of transition to another form of care during an
interval. For individual i let PiT denote these same probabilities. Each
individual will have different values of such probabilities as indexed
by i because each individual will have different grade of membership
scores, Bib to each of the fuzzy sets. We use the representation similar
to equation (2) above with the subscript j replaced by T. Explicitly,
K

PiT =

L BikAkT .

(4)

k=l

In equation (4), AkT parameters vary according to the type of provider
(SjHMO, HMO, or FFS) and are specific to the period of time since enrollment. The period of time is the three year period of the project.
We then set up the likelihood for the dis enrollment data for the three
year period as a competing risk model where the end of the study is the
competing risk. Thus, individuals terminating the S/HMO and joining
the FFS or HMO could be followed as a new entrant into one of those
samples. We use PiT as the probability of dis enrollment. Given that
the Bik are known (determined using the 31 health variables), the only
unknown parameters in this model are the AkT parameters. These are
estimated using maximum likelihood similar to equation (3) (Manton et
al., 1994).
Once the AkT have been estimated, the likelihood of dis enrollment
from the S/HMO or HMO can be determined for any particular hypo-
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the tical individual for whom the 9ik are known by using equation (4).
The probability of voluntary termination of coverage for an individual
with 9ik scores determined from the health screening form using the
parameters in Table 2 can be estimated by blending the estimated AkT
values as given in equation (4).
Naturally one can estimate other characteristics of interest such as
utilization, cost, or mortality. In any case, the actuary can estimate the
likely values of the characteristic of interest by determining the profile
of 9ik scores for the block of business of interest and then using these
scores to blend the relevant estimated AkT values. Below we will report
the AkT values estimated for dis enrollment.

4
4.1

Enrollment Findings
Enrollment and Disenrollment

Table 4 lists the average value of the 9ikS for each of the six groups at
the beginning of the study and at the end of each of the three years. At
baseline (year 0), Group 1 has average values of 50.2 percent for S/HMO
members, 39.9 percent for FFS members, and 51.4 percent for HMO
members. For the healthy fuzzy set, the S/HMOs and the HMOs attract
similar populations. In addition, these two populations are healthier,
in general, than the FFS population because of the greater percentages
in Groups 1 and 5 (the healthier groups) and the lower percentages in
Groups 2, 3, 4, and 6 (the sicker groups). The selection processes that
either explicitly or implicitly are established with regard to S/HMO and
HMO enrollment are functioning to enroll a healthier population.
Over the three years the average scores for Group 1 increased 10
to 12 percent for the three treatments. Group 5 realized a lower rate
of increase for S/HMOs and HMOs and a slight decrease for FFS. Other
groups decrease in prevalence with the exception of Group 2 for FFS.
Increases in the healthy groups (Group 1 and Group 5) and decreases in
the other groups suggest that attrition due to mortality and dis enrollment is favorable for all three treatments. Hence, the S/HMOs receive
a positive benefit from the mortality and dis enrollment patterns. Additionally, Group 6, a target group for the S/HMOs, is less prevalent
in S/HMOs and HMOs than in the FFS and declines faster than in the
FFS. By the end of the third year the average scores for the S/HMO and
the HMO have converged to approximately the same value, except for
Group 5.
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Table 4
The Effect of Mortality on Health Score Av~rages for S/HMOs, HMOs,
and FFS Populations as Defined at Baseline Over Three Years for One,
Two, and Three Year Survivors

gk
Group/Treatment

Year 0

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

I1g

1. Healthy
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

50.2
39.9
51.4

51.3
41.7
53.0

52.5
43.4
54.1

56.3
44.2
54.6

+12.0%
+10.4%
+10.6%

2. Acutely III
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

9.4
12.6
11.2

9.1
12.6
10.8

9.0
12.7
10.7

9.1
12.8
10.3

- 3.1%
+1.4%
-7.8%

3. IADL Impaired
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

8.2
10.1
7.2

7.8
9.8
6.8

7.3
9.5
6.6

7.3
9.3
6.3

-11.2%
-7.4%
-12.1%

4. Chronic Circulatory
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

10.4
13.1
10.6

10.2
12.9
10.1

9.4
12.4
9.8

9.5
12.2
9.7

- 8.1%
- 7.5%
- 8.4%

5. Older Healthy
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

19.6
18.8
17.5

19.9
18.7
17.8

20.4
18.4
17.7

21.6
18.3
18.0

+10.4%
- 2.7%
+2.7%

2.4
5.5
2.2

1.8
4.3
1.5

1.4
3.6
1.2

1.1

3.3
1.0

-54.6%
-39.1%
-53.2%

6. Frail
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

Note:

I1g

=

Percentage change in average scores from year 0 to year 3.
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Prior Cost of Care

A surrogate proposed as an indicator of poor health or expected
high utilization in managed care (and to a lesser extent for individual
health care coverage) is prior utilization. We use prior Medicare costs
for the 12 months prior to the study as a measure of this utilization and
compare it with the mortality outcome of each of the individuals. The
results are listed in Table 5. In year one S/HMOs have the highest per
enrollee costs for nonsurvivors ($4,467) and the lowest for survivors
($1,192). FFS costs are highest for survivors ($1,650), and HMOs have
the lowest costs for nonsurvivors ($2,629). Over the three years prior
costs for S/HMO and HMO nonsurvivors converge toward those of FFS.
The difference in prior cost among survivors, however, is relatively constant. This indicates a potentially fundamental difference in the use of
health care facilities among those who voluntarily join a managed care
organization and those who do not. Additionally, we see that the ability
of prior costs to predict mortality declines over time.

5

Disenrollment Findings

The major purpose of this study is to examine the S/HMO and HMO
dis enrollment patterns as a function of health status. Disenrollment
may increase or decrease any favorable bias in S/HMO or HMO enrollment. Table 6 summarizes episodes by health group. The probabilities
of transition reported in Table 6 are estimated using equation (4). The
first column in Table 6 describes the six groups and the types of coverage. The next three columns indicate the estimated probabilities that
an individual will change coverage, e.g., "moved from an S/HMO to FFS,"
or "moved from FFS to an HMO," if the individual is a complete member of the group. The next column gives the probability of dying for
a complete member of the group. The last column is for the original
HMO. An individual may be in the HMO under study and subsequently
be discharged to another HMO (column 3). The numbers in parentheses
in each column are the average number of days before such a transition.
Asterisked values indicate retention rates.
From Table 6 we see that for complete members of Group 1 in the
S/HMO, 73.6 percent will remain in the S/HMO for the entire study
with the mean number of days equal to 1062.8, and 8.9 percent will
be discharged to HMO status. The average length of time remaining in
S/HMO for those discharged to HMOs is 525.7 days.

......
t;O

o

Table 5
Changes in the Prior (to Study Entry) 12 Month Medicare Costs (Reimbursements) for
Survivors and Nonsurvivors Over Three Years
Year 1
Treatment

Alive

Year 2
Dead

Alive

Year 3
Dead

Alive

'-

Dead

o
c

"'"'
:l
IlJ

SjHMO

FFS

$1,192
N=8,334
$1,650
N=15,162

$4,467
N=311'"
Ratio = 3.75

$1,137
N=7,939

$3,298
N= 990
Ratio = 2.00

$1,591
N=14,251

$3,246
N= 706
Ratio = 2.85

$1,067
N=7,527

$2,951
N = 1901
Ratio = 1.85

$1,522
N=13,568

$2,941
N= 1,118
Ratio = 2.76
$2,957
N = 2610
Ratio = 1.94

o

.......
:t>
I"l

.....

C
IlJ

::::!.

!::.

""'"'

IlJ

I"l

.....

I"l

HMO

(I)

$1,203
N=2,831

$2,629
N= 140
Ratio = 2.19

$1,143
N=2,728

Note: Ratio = Dead ($) / Alive ($)
"Number of deaths with Medicare prior service use data.

$2,689
N = 243
Ratio = 2.35

$1,107
N=2,610

$2,445
N= 361
Ratio = 2.21

<
o
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We estimate that 12.3 percent of the S/HMO enrollees who are complete members will move to FFS status during a three year period of
coverage. These individuals will stay an average of 441.2 days before
making the transfer. Last, 5.1 percent of the S/HMO enrollees who are
complete members of Group 1 will die, with an average of 584.0 days
from enrollment to death. The retention rates for FFS and S/HMO are
similar for Group 1 and to a lesser extent for Group 5. For the acutely
ill Groups 2, 3, and 6, however, the retention rates are highest for FFS.
Additionally, there is a significant outflow of members from S/HMO to
FFS status for these groups. The S/HMO concept is designed to serve
(Le., to provide long-term care services) those in Group 3 and Group
6. This outflow may be indicative of an unmet need or dissatisfaction
among those who are likely to require the greatest health care services.
The probabilities in Table 6 can be used to estimate the retention
rate for any individual as follows. First the Bik scores are determined for
the individual of interest. If the individual is enrolled in the S/HMO, the
likelihood of changing to FFS coverage, for example, is the weighted sum
of the probabilities of changing from S/HMO coverage to FFS as given in
Table 6 for each of the six groups. The weights used for each of these
probabilities are the Bik scores of the individual. The expected retention
of a collection of insureds is determined as the average retention all
individuals. Depending on the distribution of the Bik scores, there will
be a larger or smaller net flow of frail individuals and a relatively larger
or smaller retention of healthy individuals among the covered. Other
characteristics such as the variation in the aggregate retention, length of
stay with the insured, cost, and utilization (not given in this paper) also
may be calculated for a collection of insureds using the set of Bik scores
for the insureds. Thus, the Bik can be used to define characteristics of
the collective even though the collective may not be a homogeneous
group of individuals.
In Table 7 we adjust dis enrollment patterns for mortality. The first
column describes the initial groups and treatments. The next three
columns show the coverage to which persons move. Retention is in the
final two columns. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the risks
of change relative to the total rate (over all groups).
Most differences between HMO and S/HMO dis enrollment are due
to the likelihood the HMO members change plans. In Groups 1 and
5, HMO dis enrollees are less likely than S/HMO dis enrollees to reenter
FFS. There is no difference in reentry to FFS by the frail.
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Table 6
Episode·Based Analysis of S/HMO, HMO, and FFS Populations
Discharged To
Starting
Group
Group 1: Healthy
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

S/HMO

HMO

FFS

Death

73.6"

8.9
(625.7)
20.3
(371.5)
20.3
(275.0)

12.3
(441.2)
73.1 "
(1003.5)
9.7
(371.6)

5.1
(584.0)
5.1
(521.5)
3.5
(469.0)

65.7*
(770.5)

6.9
(511.5)
14.8
(345.1)
25.4
(276.7)

13.6
(357.8)
70.0"
(1030.0)
10.4
(346.8)

17.0
(575.1)
13.9
(476.4)
9.4
(374.6)

53.9*
(776.5)

5.6
(634.3)
12.7
(254.1)
22.2
(239.2)

18.3
(388.2)
64.1"
(1018.4)
13.4
(345.5)

21.5
(515.2)
21.8
(467.3)
13.7
(398.6)

48.7"
(779.0)

6.4
(668.3)
11.9
(286.4)
15.9
(222.6)

13.2
(409.0)
64.3"
(1035.4)
13.4
(456.6)

17.7
(539.5)
23.2
(473.6)
13.1
(436.4)

55.9*
(827.7)

1.4
(389.3)
0.5
(480.4)

Group 2: Acutely III
S/HMO
61.8"
FFS
HMO

(1048.8)
1.4
(448.6)
0.2
(520.3)

Group 3: IADL Impaired
54.6*
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

(1047.6)
1.4
(364.3)
0.5
(487.5)

Group 4: Chronic Circulatory
62.2*
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

(1057.8)
0.6
(421.7)
1.2
(151.6)

Group 5: Older Healthy
69.1"
S/HMO
FFS
HMO
Group 6: Frail
S/HMO
FFS
HI\10

Ending in
HMO

(1051.0)
0.8
(326.3)
0.9
(444.1)

11.4
(535.5)
19.2
(279.4)
18.2
(234.7)

14.1
(430.3)
63.6"
(1002.9)
10.1
(349.7)

5.4
(605.9)
16.4
(472.7)
6.3
(465.8)

64.1 "
(766.4)

31.3*
(1065.7)
0.2
(269.0)
0.8
(491.2)

0.7
(428.0)
5.0
(237.7)
12.1
(326.5)

14.8
(393.6)
41.7*
(1044.8)
20.0
(441.5)

53.2
(484.1)
53.2
(401.3)
37.3
(308.4)

29.2"
(847.6)

Total Proportion of Episodes Ending in:
(67.9%)*
(8.5%:
S/HMO
(1.1%)
FFS
(16.9%:
(0.6%)
(20.0%:
HMO

(13.2%)
(67.4%)"
(10.7%)

(10.2%)
(14.6%)
(7.1%)

(61.1%)"
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Table 7
Case Mix and Total Discharge Rates for S/HMO, HMO, and FFS
Service Episodes Over Three Years With Mortality Eliminated
Discharged To
Starting
Group 1:
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

TDR

Enders

22.4
22.9
31.7

77.6%
77.0%
68.3%

24.7
18.8
39.5

74.2%
81.2%
59.3%

30.4
18.1
41.9

69.3%
74.4%
56.5%

23.8
16.3
35.1

75.9%
83.6%
64.3%

27.0
24.0
3l.3

73.0%
76.3%
68.8%

33.1
11.1
52.3

67.0%
89.2%
46.4%
75.9%
78.9%
66.2%

(776.7)

S/HMO

HMO

FFS

9.4
21.4
21.1

l3.0

1.5
0.5

Group 2:
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

8.3
17.2
27.9

16.4

1.6
0.2

Group 3:
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

7.1
16.3
25.8

23.3

1.8
0.6

Group 4:
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

7.8
15.5
18.3

16.0

0.8
1.4

Group 5:
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

12.1
23.0
19.5

14.9

1.0
1.0

Group 6:
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

1.5
10.7
19.2

31.6

0.4
l.3

Total
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

9.4
19.8
21.6

14.7

l.3
0.6

11.6

24.1
21.1
33.8

Avg. Our.
S/HMO
FFS
HMO

(1057.8)
(387.5)
(405.0)

(596.1)
(331.7)
(262.0)

(420.5)
(10l3.1)
(375.0)

(551.8)
(466.9)
(421.2)

10.1

11.4

15.5

15.4

10.8

31.8

Notes: TDR = Total Discharge Rate; Avg. Dur. = Average Duration in Days;
Enders = Percentage ending in the state they started in.
Figures in parentheses indicate class speCific risk of transition relative to
the marginal rate.
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When considering the net change in HMO members relative to the
FFS client pool, we see the same pattern as described above. Explicitly,
HMOs receive a net relative increase in clients from the FFS sector for
the healthy and acutely ill and a net relative decrease from the frail
groups. For the chronic care cases, the experience is neutral between
the FFS and HMO transfers. Consequently, the HMOs are recipients of
fortuitous reverse cumulative antis election, whereas the FFS client pool
experiences an accumulation of antiselection.

6 Conclusion
In this paper we present an analysis of dis enrollment patterns of
elderly in two different types of managed care plans: the TEFRA HMO
and the S/HMO, representing coverage expanded to include long-term
care services. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine whether
different dis enrollment patterns are observed and if differential enrollment increases or decreases any enrollment bias in a managed care population. To adjust disenrollment for differences in frailty and disability, we develop a case mix index based on fuzzy set theory. A formula
based on data gathered on the health screening form survey is included
so that individual scores can be determined for other enrolled groups.
Comparisons of prior utilization (costs) using this case mix index indicate that it captures differences in health care need as measured by
this surrogate.
The results indicate that the S/HMO and the HMO have favorable enrollment in that the case mix for both of these types of managed care
is healthier as measured by the case mix index than the FFS sample
observed. The differences are confirmed in the differential mortality
patterns and the differences in prior utilization. Disenrollment works
in favor of the managed care sectors in that those with higher levels of
frailty have a higher likelihood of dis enrolling from managed care than
healthy enrollees. The result of the observed disenrollment pattern is
to give managed care a further advantage in needed care relative to the
FFS client population. This is evidence that the cumulative antis election
process identified by Bluhm (1982) works in reverse in HMO-FFS transitions. There is evidence, however, that healthier individuals transfer
from one HMO to another. Thus, it indicates that as a greater portion
of the elderly population is enrolled to receive care under a managed
care format, the collective experience for managed care facilities will
degenerate as a result of a decrease in the rate of discharges to FFS.
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In addition to the financial implications of the results presented
here, the data suggest that the major reason for dis enrollment could
be dissatisfaction with services. Those who are frail or are in more
need of care have the highest dis enrollment rate. Apparently, the type
of service and care provided by a managed care facility is best for those
who need little care or only acute care.
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Abstract
This paper develops a methodology that can be used by insurers to construct predictive models for their own insurance cash flows. The insurance
cash flow components evaluated include premium flows, policy loans, and
cash value surrenders. Also, the paper evaluates several hypotheses in the
insurance literature that attempt to explain insurance cash flows.
Though the results are theoretically consistent, they produce some interesting contrasts to findings of similar studies for whole life policies. For example,
these results confirm that: (i) the credited rate strategy is important to policy
performance; (ii) the emergency fund hypothesis appears to apply to policy
loan utilization, premium payments, and total insurance cash flows; (iii) the
arbitrage potential with regard to policy loans is reduced; and (iv) direct recognition of policy loans seems to be effective in reducing the disintermediation
risk of traditional whole life insurance policies with fixed policy loan rates.
Although policyholders do increase their use of policy loans as inflation
increases, the overall results suggest that they tend to increase contributions
to their universal life policies in order to maintain levels of protection in real
terms. Finally, interest rate risk does exist for companies issuing universal
life because changes in market interest rates lead to decreases in premiums
and in total insurance cash flows. This lends support to the alternative funds
hypothesis.
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Introduction
Universal Life

Universal life insurance can be described as a flexible premium, flexible benefit life insurance policy consisting of a savings or cash value
account and a term or pure insurance component. Charges for expenses
and pure insurance protection are deducted from, and interest is credited to, the cash value account (generally on a monthly basis). The
policyholder decides on the timing and amount of premium payments,
subject to certain limits. Premium payments received from the policyholder are credited to the cash value account. Universal life is characterized by a high degree of disclosure. The interest credited each month
is stated, as are the expenses and pure insurance charges. This split
of the traditional whole life policy components that is characteristic of
universal life insurance is referred to as unbundling.
The interest or credited rate on the policy is adjusted on a regular basis in line with market interest rates. The credited rate usually is
guaranteed for no more than one year, with a permanent rate guarantee
of from 4 percent to 4.5 percent. Unlike traditional whole life poliCies,
universal life poliCies often permit partial withdrawals. In addition,
policy loans are permitted. Universal life policies are characterized as
being loan intolerant, however, as they generally provide either variable policy loan rates or directly recognize policy loan utilization in the
credited rate.
The introduction of universal life insurance poliCies in 1979 resulted
from significant changes in the insurance and financial services industry. Changes in the economy as a whole contributed to their introduction and subsequent popularity as well. Deregulation in the financial services industry has led to even greater demand for life insurance
products that are competitive with other investment vehicles. A Federal Trade Commission (1979) report alleging a 1.3 percent return on
whole life insurance heightened consumer dissatisfaction with traditional cash value policies.
Given the premium and benefit flexibility, as well as crediting of market rates of interest, universal life gained popularity. Based on figures
obtained from the Life Insurance Fact Book over several years including
(1983-1991), universal life sales increased from 12 percent of ordinary
premium in 1983 to sales of over 32 percent in 1985. These same features, however, contributed to the modest decline in its popularity in
the latter part of the 1980s, with sales of universal life representing only
27 percent of ordinary life premiums in 1991. Universal life insurance
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remains an important product representing 24 percent of ordinary life
insurance in force in 1991.
The high interest rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s created
a massive outflow of funds from existing cash value products as policyholders took policy loans at unprecedented levels and surrendered
policies to take advantage of high market interest rates. 1 Policy loan
problems for some insurers became severe-replacement of their own
in-force business with a direct recognition policy was seen as the only
solution. High inflation rates contributed to the increasing dissatisfaction with traditional cash value policies because premiums and benefits
generally were fixed in amount, with no specific provision for adjustment in the amounts as a result of inflation.

1.2

Objectives

The significant flexibility provided to the policyholder by universal
life, coupled with the unbundled structure and extensive disclosure of
policy provisions and charges, makes it a particularly interesting insurance product to model. These features undoubtedly increase the
sensitivity of universal life cash flows to changes in both endogenous
and exogenous factors. This increased sensitivity also makes it more
important that the insurer understand the factors that influence universallife cash flows.
Thus the objective of this paper is threefold:
• First, to present a methodology that can be used by insurers to
construct predictive models for their own insurance cash flows. A
set of significant exogenous economic input variables is identified
for each cash flow component. These variables then are used to
develop models for the components of universal life cash flows .
• Second, the paper evaluates several hypotheses in the insurance
literature that purport to explain insurance cash flows. This evaluation provides an assessment of the significance of specific factors in explaining insurance cash flows. Identifying specific factors should aid actuaries in the product development process.
The insurance cash flow components evaluated include premium
flows, policy loans, and cash value surrenders.
IThe policy surrender rate grew steadily from 8.1 percent in 1980 to a peak of 12.3
percent in 1985. Policy loans reached 9.3 percent of assets in 1981 before beginning a
steady decline over the past decade; see Life Insurance Fact Book, 1994.

200

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.2, 1994

• Third, the paper exposes actuaries to the non-actuarial literature
on insurance cash flows.

2

Review of the Literature

This section discusses some of the potential theoretical relationships between the input and output variables. First, several hypotheses that have been proposed in the literature to explain insurance cash
flows are described. Next, the results of several prior studies related to
insurance cash flow modeling are discussed. Then hypothesized relationships are presented for each of the groups of cash flow variables.
These groups are, generally, premium flows, policy loan flows, and cash
value surrenders.

2.1

Cash Flow Hypotheses

Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain cash flows in insurance policies. 2 The arbitrage/yield spread hypothesis suggests that
policyholders are influenced by differences between the credited interest rate and market interest rates. As this spread ( credited interest
rate minus market interest rate) increases, premium payments would
be expected to increase while policy loans and surrenders would be
expected to decline. In the case of policy loans, the arbitrage/yield
spread hypothesis asserts that policyholders are motivated by differences between the policy loan rate and market interest rates (Bykerk
and Thompson, 1979). As this spread increases, the level of policy
loans will increase.
The emergency fund hypothesis asserts that policyholders view their
insurance poliCies as sources of needed funds in cases of emergency
(Wood, 1964; Rejda, 1966; Outreville, 1990). Hence, higher policy loan
demand, lower premium payments, and increased policy surrenders
may be expected during periods of high unemployment or low earnings.
The alternative funds hypothesis relates to the availability of funds
in credit markets (Schott, 1971; Pesando, 1974). This hypothesis suggests that when alternative sources of funds are difficult to obtain, policyholders may turn to their insurance policy for funds either through
increased policy loans, increased policy surrenders, or decreased premium payments.
2See Carson and Hoyt (1992, p. 242) for a description of these hypotheses with
respect to policy loan demand. Cargill and Troxel (1979) provide a cogent discussion
of these concepts and of the effect of inflation on life insurance demand.
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The rising prices/inflation hypothesis states that policy loan demand
increases, surrenders rise, and premium payments decline as the need
for additional sources of income becomes greater in periods of rising
prices (Day and Hendershott, 1977). A contrary hypothesis for the direction of premium flows during periods of inflation, however, is the
real protection hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that increased purchases of insurance may occur during periods of inflation as policyholders seek to maintain a level of real insurance protection (Houston,
1960; Neumann, 1968; Fortune, 1972; Cargill and Troxel, 1979).

2.2

Insurance Cash Flow Modeling

Numerous prior studies have investigated the relationships between
various economic and institutional variables (input variables) and insurance cash flows (output variables). Several of these have devoted special
attention to the impact of various input variables on policy loan demand
(Schott, 1971; Pesando, 1974; Bykerk and Thompson, 1979; Carson and
Hoyt, 1992). Others also have considered premiums flows and surrender activity (Cummins, 1975; Schott, 1977; Berger, 1983; Curry and
Warshawsky, 1986).
Curry and Warshawsky (1986) look at the impact of various input
variables on aggregate insurance cash flows from 1952 to 1985. They
find that rising nominal market interest rates gave policyholders the
opportunity to earn higher rates of return than those available on traditional cash value life insurance which led to an increasing flow of funds
away from such products. Lapses and surrenders also increased as market interest rates rose. In addition, they find that as interest rates rose
above the contractual loan rate, policyholders exercised the option to
take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity by borrowing against their
cash values to invest in assets earning current interest rates.
Schott (1977) performs insurance cash flow analysis based on data
from his company, The Equitable. He points out that a reasonable
proposition is to take individual cash flow items and test each for statistical associations with life insurance or external economic and financial
variables. He indicates, however, that multicollinearity and functional
instability of the parameters must be viewed as potential problems.
Berger (1983) analyzes the impact of various input variables on life
insurance cash flows at Metropolitan Life. He finds that life insurance
surrenders can be explained by a model containing only the unemployment rate and the yield on three month Treasury bills. Increases in unemployment are found to lead to increased surrenders, and increases
in the T-bill rate also are found to generate increased surrenders.
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Several prior studies have devoted special emphasis to modeling
policy loan flows. Schott (1971) investigates the impact of various input variables (including the four to six month commercial paper rate
and the percentage change in the money supply) on the net increase
in policy loans. 3 Cummins (1975) and Berger (1983) consider modeling
policy loan flows. Bykerk and Thompson (1979) also perform a compre"
hensive analysis of policy loan demand. In addition, Carson and Hoyt
(1992) assess the impact that redesigned policy loan provisions in life
insurance poliCies and changes in financial markets have had on the
demand for policy loans after 1980.

2.3

Hypothesized Relationships Between the Input and Output Variables

Several hypotheses have been proposed to explain variations in the
cash flows of insurance poliCies. These hypotheses lead to the expected
analytic relationships between the various insurance cash flows or output variables (premiums, policy loans, and policy surrenders) and the
input variables (unemployment, interest rates, inflation, yield spread,
and others) that are presented in Table 1.
Market interest rates are used to test the alternative funds hypothesis. Higher interest rates reflect reduced availability of funds in credit
markets. Also, if interest rates represent the returns available from
alternative investments, a decline in these rates would make the guarantees in a universal life policy more attractive. Hence, premium flows
would be related negatively to interest rates, while the demand for policy loans and surrenders would increase with increases in these rates.
The change in the money supply, CHGM1, also is used to measure the
availability of funds in credit markets. Specific definitions of the variables mentioned in the next several paragraphs are provided in Table
2.
SPREAD1 and SPREAD2, the differences between the credited rate
and market interest rates, are used to test the arbitrage/yield spread
hypothesis. As the yield differential for investing dollars in the universal life policy increases relative to other options, premium flows
increase and loan utilization and surrenders decrease.

3In particular, Schott (1971) found that the four to six month commercial paper rate
and the percentage change in the money supply produced the highest adjusted R2. He
also tested net changes in consumer credit and changes in consumer prices.
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Table 2
Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
Variable

Description of the Variable

Panel A: Premium Activity
NEWPREM
RENPREM
REPPREM
NISSUES
NPAY

Total amount of premiums received from new
policyholders;
Total amount of premiums received from existing
policyholders;
Total amount of premiums paid by cash values
transferred from old policies;
Number of new policies issued;
Number of premium payments made;

Panel B: Policy Loan Activity
LNREPAY
NEWLOAN
TLOAN

Amount of outstanding loans repaid in the month;
Amount of new loans made in the month;
Total amount of outstanding loans;

Panel C: Surrender Activity
NETFULL

Total amount of full cash value surrenders after
adjustment for surrender charges;

Panel D: Other Internal Variables
CRATE
CASHVAL Value
LOANRATE

Current credited interest rate for all funds received
in the month;
Aggregate cash value of all existing policies;
This is the policy loan rate, including opportunity
cost. LOANRATE = 8 + (CRATE - 4), where 8 percent
is the contractual loan rate and (CRATE - 4) represents the opportunity costs because the loaned
cash value is credited with only the guaranteed
rate;
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Table 2 (cont.)
Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
Variable

Description of the Variable

Panel E: Interest Rates
CD
CPAPER
AAA

BM
TBILL3
TBILL6
TBILLYR
TNOTE
TBOND

Average yield
Average yield
Average yield
Average yield
Average yield
Average yield
Average yield
Average yield
Average yield

on 90 day certificates of deposit;
on 30 day commercial paper;
on corporate bonds rated Aaa;
on corporate bonds rated Baa;
on three month Treasury bills;
on six month month Treasury bills;
on one year Treasury bills;
on five year Treasury securities;
on long-term Treasury securities;

Panel F: Other Economic Variables
INFLATE
UNEMPLOY
EARN
CONINT
CHGMI

Unadjusted monthly inflation rate (CPHV);
Percentage of unemployed civilian workers;
Average weekly earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers of major corporations;
Rate on short-term consumer loans from nonbank
financial institutions;
Monthly percentage change in the money supply
(Ml);

Panel G: Combined Endogenous/Exogenous Variables
SPREAD 1

SPREAD2
ARBIT

Yield differential between the credited rate and the
yield on 90 day certificates of deposit, i.e.,
CRATE - CD;
Yield differential between the credited rate and the
yield on three month T-bills, i.e., CRATE - TBILL3;
Arbitrage, i.e., Loan Rate - Credited Rate.
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The spread between market rates, such as TBILL3 and CPAPER, and
the loan rate paid on policy loans (LOAN RATE) is used to test the arbitrage hypothesis. The greater the spread, the greater the incentive for
the policyholder to utilize policy loans. Due to the provision for direct
recognition of policy loans that is used by the company being evaluated,
however, the arbitrage variables may be insignificant. 4
The unemployment rate, UNEMPLOY, and the level of earnings, EARN,
are used to test the emergency fund hypothesis. Hence, premium flows
are related negatively to UNEMPLOY, while the demand for policy loans
and surrenders increases with increases in UNEMPLOY. The expected
correlations for EARN are reversed. The impact of UNEMPLOY on loan
repayments, LNREPAY, is unclear because increasing unemployment
may make repayment difficult for many policyholders, but it will lead
to increased policy surrenders which will result in loan repayments if
the surrendered poliCies have outstanding loans.
The inflation rate, INFLATE, is used to test between two competing hypotheses, the inflation/rising prices hypothesis and the real protection hypothesis. The first suggests a negative relationship between
premium flows and INFLATE, while the demand for policy loans and
surrenders increases with increases in INFLATE. The real protection hypothesis suggests a positive correlation between premium flows and
INFLATE.
Additionally, the amount of outstanding loans, TLOAN, represents
the amount of loans available for repayment. Hence, the correlation
between LNREPAY and TLOAN is expected to be positive. As the amount
of cash value, CASHVAL, places a cap on the amount of loans that can
be made, increases in cash value are expected to be related positively
to NEWLOAN.

3
3.1

Data Sources
Endogenous Data

The endogenous insurance data represent the experience of a large
stock life insurance company's universal life policy from the end of
4The universal life policy of the company considered in the study provides that the
loaned cash value is credited with only the guaranteed rate, 4 percent. The contractual
loan rate is 8 percent. Hence, the effective loan rate is LOANRATE = 8 + (CRATE - 4),
where the second term represents the opportunity cost of borrowing. Note that the
arbitrage potential, TBILL3 - LOANRATE, reduces to SPREAD2, a constant. In other
words, due to the direct recognition of policy loans in this policy, the arbitrage and
yield spread concepts are linked closely.
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the third quarter of 1982 to the end of the first quarter of 1986. The
data are monthly observations. Attempts were made to collect data
from additional insurers that offer universal life policies. A number
of insurers, however, could not provide the requested data due to the
lack of comprehensive databases on their universal life policies. Other
insurers had existing databases, but considered the requested data to
be proprietary.
Nevertheless, use of this insurer's universal life insurance data is
not expected to bias the results for the following reasons. First, the
sampled insurer is relatively large, being among the top 40 life insurers
and among the top 20 stock life insurers based on life insurance in
force. Second, the sampled insurer's universal life policy features are
reasonably representative of the policies being offered by other insurers
and its policy is approved in all states. Hence, although only one insurer
is represented, the behavior of policyholders across the U.S. is reflected
in the cash flows. Several other insurance cash flow studies have been
forced to rely on data from one insurer (Schott, 1977; Berger, 1983).
Finally, the sampled insurer's policy loan and surrender experience over
the estimation period is generally equivalent to the experience in the
industry.5
3.2

Exogenous Data

The exogenous economic data come from several government publications. The interest rate data represent the averages of weekly rates
for each month of the observation period. The weekly rates are taken
from u.s. Financial Data, which is published by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. The data for unemployment and earnings are taken
from Employment and Earnings, and the data for inflation are taken
from CPI Detailed Report, both published by the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, the data for the consumer
interest rate and the change in the money supply (M1) are taken from
the Federal Reserve Bulletin, published by the Federal Reserve Board.
The data variables considered in the study are presented in Table 2.
SIn 1985 the industry surrender rate was 12.3 percent while the surrender rate for
the sampled insurer was 14.8 percent. The percentage of assets in policy loans for
the industry in 1985 was 6.6 percent and for the sampled insurer the figure was 7.9
percent. For the sampled insurer the percentage of universal life insurance in force in
1985 relative to ordinary life insurance was 6.2 percent. The comparable figure for the
industry was 8.9 percent.
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Empirical Estimation Procedure

The first step in the estimation procedure is to determine a set of
input or independent variables that can be justified as predictors of the
insurance cash flow variable being considered. Second, the correlations
between the various independent variables and the cash flow variables
are examined to determine whether the correlations confirm the expectations identified in Table 1 and to gain some insight into the predictive
power of the individual independent variables. Also, evaluation of the
correlation matrix allows an initial assessment of how severe potential
problems of multicollinearity may be. 6
Third, the ridge trace plots are calculated for the set of independent
variables to determine which variables appear to have coefficients that
stabilize quickly and are nonzero. The ridge trace for each independent
variable is calculated using the procedure RIDGEREG in the SAS statistical package. 7 The results indicate a subset of variables that should
be considered for elimination from the model, specifically, those that
have either unstable or zero coefficients.
Fourth, ridge regression is used to allow estimation of the coefficients without the negative and confounding influences introduced by
multicollinearity, which is present in most of the estimations. Ridge
regression achieves this by adding small positive amounts to the diagonal of the X' X matrix. 8 This produces biased regression estimates but
can reduce the mean standard error. A discussion of ridge regression
is found in Hoerl and Kennard (l970a, 1970b, 1976).9
In applying the regression analysis, backward elimination and forward stepwise regression are used. The ridge regression model is compared against the same model estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression. This comparison permits assessment of the impact, if any,
that multicollinearity has on the estimation. If the results are not greatly
different, the OLS regression model is preferred due to the unbiased6 Multicollinearity refers to the mathematical estimation problems associated with
estimating parameters in a regression model in the presence of high levels of crosscorrelation between independent variables. Multicollinearity is not necessarily a problem if the sole purpose of the regression model is prediction of the dependent variable.
7SASVersion 5.18. Cary, N.C.: SAS Institute, Inc., 1986.
SHere X' denotes the transpose of the matrix X.
9 An alternative procedure for the estimation of the models in the presence of multicollinearity would be principal components analysis. Principal components analysis
has the advantage over ridge regression of producing unbiased estimators. Unfortunately, the calculation in principal components analysis makes the results difficult to
interpret because the estimator is a mixture of all of the original coefficients. Greene
(1993: 273) points out that it is unlikely that these combinations can be interpreted in
any meaningful way.
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ness of OLS regression estimates. During the ridge regression analysis,
the RP-criterion, which is developed in Erickson (1981), also is evaluated
to assess the appropriateness of the model. IO
Finally, the residuals from the regression model are analyzed. The
residuals are evaluated to determine if any nonstochastic trend is present
over time. Also, the residuals are checked for heteroscedasticityll and
to assess whether higher order terms of the independent variables are
indicated. Appropriate adjustments are made if any violations of the
model assumptions are identified from the residual analysis.
Schott (1977) points out that one potential problem with cash flow
analysis is the need to forecast values for the independent variables in
order to obtain estimates of the cash flow variable. After some comparative analysis of the regressions, it is determined that this potential
problem can be addressed by lagging the input variables at a small cost
in loss of predictive power. Therefore, as indicated by the (t - 1) subscripts on most of the input variables, the majority of the input series
are lagged one month.
Insurers have an interest in estimating insurance cash flows, but
they also care about identifying the specific factors that influence these
cash flows. Identifying these specific factors is important as part of the
product development process. As a result of this twofold interest by insurers, the best model identified is the model that explains the greatest
amount of variation, as measured by R2, and in which the independent
variables are each statistically significant.
Extrapolation of regression results beyond the range of estimation
should be done with caution. This includes applying the results estimated below without modification to other time periods or to other
insurers. The analysis has been framed in the context of the general
hypotheses (emergency fund, inflation/rising prices, alternative funds)
to increase the likelihood that the results will be relevant to insurers in
general. The results below give insurers some direction in identifying
the factors that are likely to impact insurance cash flows and demonstrate the mechanics of the regression modeling procedure.
IOThe optimal model has the minimum ridge prediction (RP) value.
II Heteroscedasticity refers to the problems generated in regression analysis when
the variance of the residuals is not constant. SpeCifically, in several of the models
various variance-stabilizing transformations of the dependent variable are utilized.
These include square root, log, and inverse transformations.
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5 Parameter Estimation for the Cash Flow Models
5.1

Estimated Cash Flow Models for Premiums

The best model identified for NEWPREM, the aggregate flow ofpremiurns from policyholders purchasing new policies, results from regressing In(NEWPREM) on the input variables BAA, INFLATE, UNEMPLOY, and
SPREAD 1. 12 The results of the ridge regression are similar to the results
using OLS regression, so the OLS model is reported here. 13 The model
is:
Lo 9 (NEWPREMt )

1B.7 - 0.461 x BAAt-1

+ 0.645 x INFLATE t- 1
- 0.157 x UNEMPLOYt-1
+ 0.277 X SPREAD1 t - 1

(1)

with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.732.14
As anticipated, new premium flows are sensitive to the yield premium available for investing dollars in a universal life policy as opposed
to other options. This is supported by the positive sign on SPREAD 1 and
conforms with the expectations of the arbitrage/yield spread hypothesis. The negative sign on UNEMPLOY indicates that increases in unemployment could be expected to reduce the amount of new premiums
paid, which supports the emergency fund hypothesis. The single input
12The specific variables that appear in the model, BAA versus AAA or SPREAD 1 versus
SPREAD2, are less important than the broader hypotheses that the specific variables
represent because the specific variables are likely to be sensitive to the time period
under study. Some previous studies of insurance cash flows, such as Carson and Hoyt
(1992), specify the models in terms of changes rather than levels of the dependent
variable. In addition, various studies have used constructs known as stock adjustment
models. Carson and Hoyt report that the results of the estimation are not altered significantly by the choice of changes versus levels. Also, the coefficients on the stock
adjustment construct in their model for policy loans indicate that the stock adjustment framework is not statistically significant. The purpose of the present paper is
to evaluate various hypotheses while providing models that can serve to predict the
insurance cash flows. It seems that predicting the level of cash flows would be the
most useful to practicing actuaries. Therefore, the models are estimated in terms of
levels of cash flows instead of changes. Reference to stock adjustment models can be
found in Carson and Hoyt (1992, p. 246).
13The values in parentheses for the OLS regression models are the t-statistics. Values
of 2.00 or greater are statistically significa~t at no less than the 0.05 level. For the ridge
regression models, the values cannot be considered to have a t-distribution due to the
biased nature of ridge regression. They can be interpreted in a similar fashion, however,
with values above 2.00 suggesting statistically significant relationship.
l-lThroughout this paper, all figures are presented to three significant digits. Small
or large numbers arc reported using scientific notation.
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variable with the most predictive power is BAA. In accordance with the
alternative funds hypothesis, the coefficient on this variable is negative which suggests that as money stocks tighten, fewer funds would
be used to purchase universal life policies. The positive coefficient on
INFLATE seems to suggest that as inflation increases, individuals perceive a need for increased insurance. In reaction to this perception, they
increase their nominal purchases of insurance. This increased demand
leads to an increase in nominal premium cash flows as inflation rises.
This is consistent with the real protection hypothesis.
The best model identified for REPPREM, the aggregate flow of premiums paid by cash values transferred from replacement of old policies
(non-universal life policies), results from regressing REPPREM on the
input variables BAA, INFLATE, UNEMPLOY, and SPREAD2. The results
of the ridge regression are similar to the results using OLS regression,
so the OLS model is reported here. The model is:
REPPREMt

7.52 X 10 5 - 3.09 X 104 x BAA t- 1
+ 8.56 x 104 x INFLATE t- 1
- 3.51 x 104 x UNEMPLOYt-l
+ 4.52 x 104 x SPREAD2 t- 1

(2)

with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.698.
The results for REPPREM are similar to those for NEWPREM. But there
are some differences. First, SPREAD2 replaces SPREAD1 and is somewhat more significant in the model for replacement premium flows.
The replacement of SPREAD1 by SPREAD2 is probably not especially
important. SPREAD1 is the spread between the credited rate and the
yield on CDs, while SPREAD2 is the spread between the credited rate
and the 90 day T-bill rate. One interpretation may be that individuals considering new policy purchases are interested in the competitiveness of the policy relative to alternative investments such as CDs. On
the other hand, individuals considering replacement of currently held
policies are interested in the attractiveness of the policy relative to the
risk-free rate in the market.
Second, a comparison of the elasticities with respect to each of the
predictor variables suggests the following about the differences between the estimated equations for NEWPREM and REPPREM. The elasticities for INFLATE, UNEMPLOY, and the spread variables are relatively
similar between the two equations which suggests little difference in
the sensitivity of NEWPREM and REPPREM to these three predictors.
The elasticities for BAA differ substantially between the two equations. The elasticity of NEWPREM with respect to BAA is 3.7, while the
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similar figure for REPPREM is only 1.2. This seems to suggest that the
relative availability of money stocks (alternative funds hypothesis) has
less of an impact on the decision to replace an existing policy than it
does on the decision to purchase a new universal life policy.
The best model identified for RENPREM, the aggregate flow of premiums paid on existing policies, results from regressing REPPREM on the
input variables BAA, INFLATE, UNEMPLOY, and SPREAD2. The results
of the ridge regression are similar to the results using OLS regression,
so the OLS model is reported here. The model is:
RENPREM t

3.01 X 10 3 - 1.07 X 10 2 x BAA t - 1
+ 60.0 x INFLATE t - 1
- 1.25 x 10 2 x UNEMPLOYt-l

(3)

with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.925.
The major difference between the model for RENPREM and the models for NEWPREM and REPPREM is the absence of an interest rate spread
variable in the expression for RENPREM. This difference suggests that a
certain amount of inertia exists with regard to the payment of renewal
premiums. That is, a change in the level of the credited rate relative to
the yield available on alternative investments does not have as great an
impact on the decision of existing policyholders to make premium payments as it does on the decision of potential policyholders to purchase
a universal life policy.
Finally, several additional variables related to premium flows are
analyzed. These include NISSUES, the number of new policies issued,
and NPAY, the number of premium payments made on existing policies.
The best model identified for NISSUES regresses NISSUES on the input
variables BAA, INFLATE, UNEMPLOY, and SPREAD2. The results of the
ridge regression are similar to the results using OLS regression, so the
OLS model is reported here. The model is:
NISSUES t

1.01 X 10 2 - 5.50 x BAA t - 1
+ 5.39 x INFLATEt-l
- 1.77 x UNEMPLOYt-l
+ 2.25 x SPREAD2 t - 1

(4)

with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.882.
The results of the regression are similar to those for NEWPREM and
REPPREM. Specifically, the spread between the credited interest rate on
the universal life policy and the yield on alternative investments has a
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statistically significant impact on the number of new policies issued, as
well as on the total amount of premium received on new policies.
The best model identified for NPAY results from regressing NPAY
on the input variables BAA and UNEMPLOY. The results of the ridge
regression are similar to the results using OLS regression, so the OLS
model is reported here. The model is:
NPAYt

=

3.00 x 10 2

-

11.9 x BAAt-l - 11.0 x UNEMPLOYt-l

(5)

with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.956.
The results of the regression are similar to those for RENPREM. Interestingly, the spread between the credited interest rate on the universal life policy and the yield on alternative investments does not have
a statistically significant impact on the number of premiums paid on
existing policies, nor does the spread have a significant impact on the
total amount of premium received on existing policies.
The absence of INFLATE as a predictor in the model for NPAY seems
to lend some support to the earlier interpretation of the inflation variable in the premium flow models. That is, the positive coefficient on
INFLATE in the premium flow models suggests that increased inflation causes policyholders to recognize a need for increased nominal
amounts of insurance. In reaction to this, they increase the amount of
premium payments. An increase in the number of payments, however,
would not necessarily be expected. Again, this result is consistent with
the real protection hypothesis.

5.2

Estimated Cash Flow Models for Policy Loans

The best model identified for LNREPAY, the aggregate amount of existing policy loans that are repaid, results from regressing LNREPAY on
the input variables TLOAN and EARN. Due to the high cross correlation
(r) between the input variables (r = 0.795), the results of the ridge
regression are reported here. The model is:
LNREPAY t

-6.06 X 10 2 + 2.23 x EARNt-l
+ 9.97 x 10- 5 x TLOANt-l.

(6)

Bias parameter: k = 0.0053;
Coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.946; and
Ridge prediction criterion: RP = 72.58.
As anticipated, policy loan repayments are related positively to level
of earnings, EARN, confirming the emergency fund hypothesis. Although UNEMPLOY had the expected sign, it was not significant, given
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EARN is already in the model. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that
the spread between market interest rates and LOANRATE is not a significant predictor in the regression. This probably is a result of the
fact that the universal life policy being considered here is not loan tolerant. Specifically, policy loans reduce credited interest earnings on
the portion of the policy cash value supporting the loan to only the
guaranteed rate. This apparently reduces the significance of any arbitrage potential. This result contrasts with the findings of previous
researchers for whole life policies which traditionally have used a fixed
loan rate (Schott, 1971; Cummins, 1975; Bykerk and Thompson, 1979).
The result is consistent, however, with the findings of Carson and Hoyt
(1992) for policy loan utilization in the 1980s.
The best model identified for NEWLOAN, the aggregate amount of
new policy loans, results from regressing NEWLOAN on the input variables CASHVAL and INFLATE. The results of the ridge regression are
similar to the results using OLS regression, so the OLS model is reported
here. The model is:
NEWLOAN t

-4.02 + 1.36 x 10- 5 x CASHVALt-l
+ 96.6 x INFLATEt-l

(7)

with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.717.
The predictive power of the model is only slightly reduced by using
the value of cash values lagged one month. Increases in the amount
available to be borrowed, CASHVAL, increase the amount of new loans.
In accordance with the rising prices/inflation hypothesis, an increase in
the level of inflation increases the amount of new loans. Again, as seen
with respect to loan repayments, the arbitrage variable is not significant
in the model. This seems to further support the notion that the loanintolerant nature of universal life reduces the potential for arbitrage
gains through the exercise of the policy loan privilege.
The best model identified for TLOAN, the aggregate amount of outstanding policy loans, results from regressing TLOAN on the input variables CASHVAL, EARN, and SPREAD 1. Due to the high cross correlation
between the CASHVAL and EARN (r = 0.887), the results of the ridge
regression are reported here. The model is:
2.46 X 106 + 4.59 X 10- 2 x CASHVALt-l
- 8.99 x 10 3 x EARNt-l
- 1.61 x 104 x SPREAD1 t -l.

TLOAN t

Bias parameter: k

=

5.60 x 10- 4 ;

(8)
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Coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.985; and
Ridge prediction criterion: RP = 5.87 X 108 .1 5
All of the input variables in the model have the expected signs. As
observed with respect to the amount of new loans, increases in the
amount available to be borrowed, CASHVAL, increase the amount of
total loans outstanding. EARN, which is significant in describing the
amount of loan repayments, is also significant in describing the amount
of outstanding loans. Of special interest is the fact that SPREAD1 is
significant in the model for total loans. Specifically, decreases in the
yield spread between the credited rate and alternative investment returns increase the total amount of loans outstanding. That is, failure
to maintain a competitive credited rate could lead to disintermediation
through increased exercise of the policy loan privilege.
Interestingly, UNEMPLOY is not significant in any of the policy loan
models. This is important in light of the prior findings and controversy surrounding the relationship between unemployment and policy
loan utilization. Most previous studies find little correlation between
unemployment and policy loan demand (Schott, 1971; Cummins, 1975;
Bykerk and Thompson, 1979). The general opinion in the industry, however, is that policyholders use policy loans as a source of needed funds
in periods of increased unemployment.
Even though the models identified here did not find UNEMPLOY to
be a significant variable, some support for the emergency fund hypothesis is suggested. EARN is significant in the model for TLOAN, suggesting that reduced earnings may result in increased policy loans. Also,
UNEMPLOY is a significant predictor of premium flows and, due to the
discretionary nature of premium payments on a universal life policy,
reduced premium payments may serve to replace some of the demand
for increased policy loans.

5.3

Estimated Cash Flow Model for Surrenders

Because the total amount of net surrenders would be expected to
increase with the increase in the amount of cash values available upon
surrender, the actual output variable considered here is the ratio of net
full surrenders (gross full surrenders less deduction of any surrender
charges) to aggregate cash values. 16 The correlation of 0.754 between
ISNote that RP cannot be compared across models. It only is used within a given
estimation model to indicate optimal fit. For example, the best fit is obtained by minimizing RP. Here RP is large due to the units of measure for TLOAN.
16Data on partial surrenders also are available from the insurer in the study. Activity
is reported in only 20 of the 39 months covered in the study. The paucity of partial
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NETFULL and CASHVAL supports this conclusion. The best model identified for the ratio of NETFULL to CASHVAL results from regressing the
reciprocal of this ratio on UNEMPLOY and UNEMPLOY2. The inverse
of the output variable is used as a variance-stabilizing transformation.
Also, initial plots of the residuals against UNEMPLOY suggest the need
for the quadratic term. Due to the high cross correlation between the
input variables (r = 0.999), the results of the ridge regression are reported here. The model is:
NETFULL ) -1
( CASHVAL t

3.91

X

+ 7.31

104
X

-

1.07 X 104 x UNEMPLOY t -

10 2 x UNEMPLOY2 t -1.

1

(9)

Bias parameter: k = 2.00 x 10- 5 ;
Coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.717; and
Ridge prediction criterion: RP = 4.45 X 10 4 .
Although the coefficient on UNEMPLOY is negative, this is consistent with the predicted positive relationship between unemployment
and surrenders because the regression is performed on the inverse of
the output variable. The positive coefficient on UNEMPLOY2 suggests a
decreasing impact of changes in UN EMPLOY as the level of unemployment increases. These results support the emergency fund hypothesis.

5.4

Regression Model of Combined Insurance Cash Flows

To assess the impact of aggregating the individual cash flow equations above to form total insurance cash flows, a regression model is
fitted to the historical data for insurance cash flows. Insurance cash
flows at time t, INSCF t , are defined as:
INSCF t

TOTAL PREMIUMS
+ POLICY LOAN INCOME
- NET INCREASES IN POLICY LOANS
- DEATH BENEFITS
- SURRENDER BENEFITS
- EXPENSES & COMMISSIONS
- FEDERAL INCOME TAXES.

surrender activity makes a meaningful modeling of this cash flow impossible. Although
it would be interesting to investigate the impact of the surrender charge on policy
surrenders, the availability of data from only one insurer, coupled with the fact that
the insurer did not vary its surrender charge specification during the period of the
study, make this impossible.
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The best model identified for INSCF results from regressing INSCF
on the input variables BAA, UNEMPLOY, and SPREAD2. The results of
the ridge regression are similar to the results using OLS regression, so
the OLS model is reported here. The model is:
INSCF t

3.34 X 10 6 - 1.41 X 10 5 x BAAt-l
- 1.34 x 10 5 x UNEMPLOY t - 1
+ 6.55 x 104 x SPREAD2 t - 1

(10)

with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.780.
Two major results of this estimation are worth noting. First, the
variable INFLATE is not present in the regression model for total insurance cash flows. In other words, it appears that inflation is not a
significant predictor once death benefits, expenses, commissions, and
so forth are netted out of insurance cash flows. This adds additional
support to the earlier conclusion that policyholders adjust premium
payments in order to maintain real levels of protection.
Second, the three predictors that are significant in the model, BAA,
UNEMPLOY, and SPREAD2, are found in the premium flow models. This
is not surprising because premium flows are the dominant component
of total insurance cash flows. These findings support the alternative
funds, emergency fund, and arbitrage/yield spread hypotheses as explanations for total insurance cash flows.
Table 3 provides a summary of the results of the various regression
models estimated in the paper.

6

Summary and Conclusions

In this paper, several regression models for insurance cash flows on
a universal life policy are developed. The models relate various theoretically justifiable input variables, both exogenous and endogenous,
to the relevant cash flow or output variables. The results are theoretically consistent, but produce some interesting contrasts to findings of
similar studies for whole life policies.
Several interesting results are found. First, not surprisingly, the
credited rate strategy is important to policy performance. New and replacement premium flows are sensitive to the credited rate yield spread,
as is the amount of total policy loans. Second, the emergency fund hypothesis appears to apply to policy loan utilization, premium payments,
and total insurance cash flows. That is, increases in unemployment lead
to decreased premium payments and increased surrenders, as well as

tv

Table 3
Regression Model Results
Dependent Variable
(Equation)
log(NEWPREM)
Equation (1)
REPPREM
Equation (2)
RENPREM
Equation (3)
NISSUES
Equation (4)
NPAY
Equation (5)
LNREPAY
Equation (6)
NEWLOAN
Equation (7)
TLOAN
Equation (8)
(NTFULLjCASHVALt 1
Equation (9)
INSCF
Equation (10)

R2
73.2%
69.8%
92.5%
88.2%
95.6%
94.6%
71.7%
98.5%
94.0%
78.0%

f-'

00

Intercept and Independent Variables (Sign of Coefficient)
(Value of Coefficient's t-Statistic*)
18.7
(15.09)
7.51 X 105
(5.02)
3.01X103
(20.36)
1.01X 102
(12.98)
3.00X 102
(29.54)
-6.06x10 2
(-8.54)
-4.02
(-0.27)
2.46X10 6
(8.37)
3.91X104
(9.14)
3.34x106
(8.36)

BAA (-)
(-4.33)
BAA (-)
(-2.57)
BAA (-)
(-9.25)
BAA (-)
(-8.82)
BAA (-)
(-15.38)

INFLATE (+)
(3.19)
INFLATE (+)
(3.49)
INFLATE (+)
(2.01)
INFLATE (+)
(4.23)
UNEMPLOY (-)
(-18.82)

UNEMPLOY (-)
(-2.32)
UNEMPLOY (-)
(-4.62)
UNEMPLOY (-)
(-15.48)
UNEMPLOY (-)
(-4.48)

EARN (+)

TLOAN (+)
(8.00)
INFLATE (+)
(4.06)
EARN (-)
(-8.53)

(8.96)
CASHVAL (+)
(9.24)
CASHVAL (+)
(27.18)
UNEMPLOY (-)
(-9.67)
BAA (-)
(-4.45)

UNEMPLOY (-)
(-6.29)

SPREADI (+)
(3.15)
SPREAD2 (+)
(3.94)

I.-

0

s::

.....

::l

PJ

SPREAD2 (+)
(3.76)

0
.....,

»
r.
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s::

PJ
:::::!.

e:!..
-0
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PJ
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r.

SPREADI (-)
(-3.60)

UNEMPLOy2 (+)
(10.62)
SPREAD2 (+)
(2.04)

"The t-statistics values in parentheses of 2.00 or greater are statistically significant at no less than the 0.05 level.
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to decreased total insurance cash flows. Decreases in earnings lead to
increased total policy loans. Third, the arbitrage potential with regard
to policy loans is reduced. Direct recognition of policy loans seems to
be effective in reducing the disintermediation risk that exist in traditional whole life insurance policies with fixed policy loan rates. Fourth,
although policyholders do increase their use of policy loans as inflation
increases, the overall results suggest that they tend to increase contributions to their universal life policies in order to maintain levels of
protection in real terms. This provides support for the real protection
hypothesis. Finally, interest rate risk does exist for companies issuing
universal life because changes in market interest rates lead to decreases
in premiums and in total insurance cash flows. This lends support to
the alternative funds hypothesis.
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Modal Premium Factors in Ordinary Life Insurance
James B. Ross* and Criss G. Woodrufft

Abstract
For ordinary life policyholders who want to pay more frequently than annually, insurers construct schedules of modal premium factors that reflect
additional charges for the costs of collection, forgone interest, and premiums
uncollected or refunded in the year of death. Competition within the industry
forces convergence of such schedules. On the other hand, if such factors for a
given company reflect its own experience (in expense, interest, mortality, and
persistency), the differences between companies will force schedules apart.
Analysis of a large group of life insurers over the 1972-1982-1992 period
shows that modal premium factors are dustered closely, that they are becoming more dispersed over time, and that the mean factors are increasing as a
percentage of premiums. These findings are consistent with the viewpoint
that modal premium factors are beginning to reflect individual company experience and that the companies increasingly are able to cover the additional
costs of business written on other than an annual basis.
Key words and phrases: price competition, company experience, expenses, fractional, mortality
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Introduction
Companies selling products under installment purchase plans must
make adjustments for the costs of lost interest and of handling payments. If the borrower defaults on a collateralized obligation, the company has recourse; if the default occurs on a nonrecourse instrument,
the seller/lender has repayment procedures that are intended to maximize the recovery. With the exception of their single premium products, life insurers sell most of their products on the installment purchase plan. Two important differences distinguish these plans from
the typical commercial transaction:
• The buyer may die at any time, triggering the benefit provisions
and generally making further premium payments unnecessary under the terms of the contract; and
• At his or her option, the buyer may discontinue premium payments, an action that triggers the applicable nonforfeiture option.
The actuarial calculation of modal or fractional premiums (premiums payable on a basis more frequent than annual) contains some complicating elements not present in the calculation of annual premiums.
For payment modes other than annual, the company adds a carrying
charge as compensation for the additional expenses associated with
more frequent premium collection, the loss of interest income due to
the deferment of some portion of the year's premium, and the higher
lapse rates that may arise when premiums are paid other than annually. Further, to the extent that companies do not collect any remaining
modal premiums in the year of death or refund the unearned portion
of such premiums already made, the carrying charge also may include
an element of life insurance (Black and Skipper, 1994).
Typical practice is to calculate gross premiums on an annual payment basis and adjust them until they satisfy company criteria of adequacy, equity, and competitiveness. Modal premium factors (MPFs) are
computed for each of the other modes of payment (quarterly, monthly,
bank draft, payroll deduction, and government allotment) in light of
company experience with the additional elements mentioned above.
These modal premium factors are published for use by agents and others in converting annual premiums to premiums for the more frequent
payment modes. The most common factors are simple percentages
(e.g., each semiannual premium payment is equal to 51 percent of the
annual premium), but a significant minority of companies uses a percentage and a constant that may differ by payment mode.
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The life insurance business was changed dramatically by the introduction of the universal life insurance contract in the late 1970s and,
to a lesser extent, by variable life insurance introduced at roughly the
same time. The 1982 Life Insurance Fact Book is the first to report a
market share for these policies: 7 percent of new policies issued and
12 percent of new face amount issued. Market share reached a high
point in 1985 of 32 percent of new policies and 41 percent of new face
amount. In recent years the market share of these contracts, which do
not require premium payments in specified amounts on specified due
dates, has leveled at about 20 percent of new policies and 27 percent
of new face amount.
This study addresses the modal premiums that are payable on policies other than universal life and variable life. These issues constitute
roughly 80 percent of new policies and 73 percent of new face amount.
The operational cost structures of life insurers undoubtedly were impacted by the reduction in new issues flowing through conventional
billing and collection systems. At the same time the shift in new issues
to flexible premium contracts required new accounting systems to be
built. Our research does not provide us with useful unit costs over time
with which to gauge this impact.
This paper addresses both average industry practice and the extent
of variation in the modal premium schedules for a large sample of life
insurance companies. Different companies experience different billing
costs, earned rates of interest, rates of mortality, and rates of persistency. In theory, these differing factors should lead to a dispersion of
modal premium factors among companies. In practice, important design elements include a simplification of the factor system for improved
agent and client understanding and a consideration of competitive factors (staying close to competitors' schedules); both of those elements
would tend to cause the schedules to converge.
This study also investigates temporal changes in industry practice.
To the extent that they are based on the additional costs associated with
these more frequent payment modes, modal premium factors should
change to reflect changing costs. We also determine how the variability
in the modal premium factors changes over time. Because company
practice relative to collection of unpaid modal premiums in the year
of death is an element in the modal premium factors, we provide an
analysis over two decades of the changing practices of companies in
that area.

224

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.2, 1994

2 Literature Review
Bowerman (1932) draws together the history, theory, and practice
(as determined from a survey of the 40 largest companies in 1930)
of fractional premiums. Although his primary purpose is to address
the adjustments necessary to accommodate company reserving practice with respect to fractional premiums, Bowerman includes a discussion of the corresponding adjustments to net premiums. Bowerman
identifies 1921 as the first year for the practice of not deducting unpaid ordinary fractional premiums for the balance of the year of death
(Travelers) and 1925 as the first year for the practice of "refunding the
'unearned' portion of whatever premium had been paid beyond the policy month in which death occurred, even on annual premium policies
... " (Metropolitan).
Several of his comments about practice in the early 1930s are interesting in light of this study's findings. He points out that" ... when
comparatively few people asked for premiums payable fractionally, a
fair sized loading was charged. When, however, a large proportion of insureds demand the privilege of paying premiums more often than once
a year, the tendency has been ... to reduce the excess of the fractional
over the annual premium ... " He indicates the awareness of higher
lapse rates on premiums payable more frequently and notes that gains
to the company on surrender are increased by the change to the more
liberal practice.
Bowerman reports that in 1932 only 40 percent of the 40 largest
companies provided the refund and nondeduction benefits in connection with fractional premiums. (The other companies continued their
long-established practice of simply deducting the unpaid fractional premiums at death.) He provides a revealing contrast to current consumer
behavior in citing this typical distribution of ordinary fractional premiums circa 1932: annual premiums constituted 50 percent of the total;
semiannual, 22 percent; quarterly, 23 percent; and monthly, 5 percent.
Preston (1934) reports the lapse rate on monthly business to be 250
percent of the lapse rate on annual business, indicating a significant opportunity cost for companies writing business on a fractional premium
basis. Guertin (1944) discusses the valuation implications of immediate payment of death claims and nondeduction of deferred premiums.
Gillan (1960) points out that "to the extent that persistency on other
than annual premium business is worse than that on annual premium
business, fractional premiums should be increased to cover the higher
cost of amortizing initial expense." Such differential persistency was
not recognized at that time, nor does it appear to be currently. Broffitt
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(1983) provides the reasoning and the algebra to correct net premiums
payable annually to net premiums on any fractional payment basis. A
clear exposition of net fractional premiums, complete with full derivations in actuarial notation, is provided for both true premiums at m
intervals and for apportionable ones in Bowers et al. (1986).

3

Data and Methodology

The sample consists of those companies for whom modal premium
factors are reported by Best's Flitcraft Compend (Life-Health) for the
years 1972, 1982, and 1992. Data are available for 78, 181, and 104
companies, respectively. The number of companies available for analysis grew substantially from 1972 to 1982, but then shrank for 1992
due to a change in A.M. Best's reporting practices. Industry average
data (specifically pertaining to sales on all lives by ordinary agents) are
from The Buyer Study: United Statesforthe years 1972,1982, and 1992,
published by LlMRA International; U.S. 25-Month Persistency, also published by LlMRA International; and from the Life Insurance Fact Book,
published by the American Council of Life Insurance.
Table 1 presents industry data on the yearly premium, voluntary
termination rate, deaths per 1,000, and investment income return for
the years 1972, 1982, and 1992.
Table 1
Average Industry Data
1982
1992
Yearly Premium
$450
$1,032
Voluntary Termination Rate*
8.3% 10.0%
Deaths per 1000**
5.1
5.5
8.58% 8.87%
Investment Income Return

1972
$200
6.0%
7.0
5.69%

* Termination rate is for all years combined.
**Deaths per 1000 population, adjusted for age.

The basic data set for our analysis consists of a vector of six modal
premium payment modes: semiannual (SA), quarterly (QTR), regular
monthly (MON), monthly preauthorized automatic bank draft (BANK),
monthly payroll deduction (SAL), and monthly government allotment
(ALLOT). A.M. Best also presents data for most firms regarding dispo-
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sition of premiums paid beyond the date of death. For each payment
mode for each of the years 1972, 1982, and 1992 we calculate univariate statistics induding mean, mode, median, maximum, minimum, and
range for the modal premium factor. In addition we calculate the percentage of reporting companies that offer a particular payment mode
(%COS) and report each payment mode as a percentage of total policies
(%POL), total premiums paid (%PREM), and total volume (face value of
policies written, %YOL). These statistics are presented in Table 2. Table
2 also presents average persistency by payment mode. 1
We then test the mean, variance, and several proportion measures
for each modal premium factor for stationarity across time. The test
for stationarity of the mean is a standard Z-test for equality of two
population means. The test for stationarity of variance is a standard
F-test for the ratio of the variances of two populations. Using another
standard Z-test we test for differences across time in the proportion
of companies offering a particular payment mode and for differences
in the proportions of total policies, total premiums, and total volume
accounted for by each premium modality. 2

4 Analysis and Findings
Panels A, B, and C of Table 2 present descriptive statistics for the
six payment modes for 1992, 1982, and 1972, respectively. Tests using the Shapiro-Wilk W-statistic 3 show that none of the payment mode
variables are normally distributed. Therefore, we present medians and
modes for each variable in addition to the mean. Two measures of
variability are reported, the standard deviation and the range.
In the absence of additional costs associated with premium modalities, modal premiums would be one half, one fourth, or one twelfth
of the annual premium for semiannual, quarterly, or monthly modes.
The carrying charges or excess premiums levied in actual practice are
substantial.

I These are average 25 month persistency rates on individual ordinary life insurance
policies as reported by LIMRA International for the periods 1973-1974 and 1983-1984.
Data for the 1993-1994 period are not yet available.
2Complete description of these statistical tests can be found in Daniel and Terrell
(1986).
3For a description of such tests, see Royston (1982).
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Panel A:
(1992 Saml2le)
NUMBER
MEAN
SD
MEDIAN
MODE
MAX
MIN
RANGE
%COS
%POL
%PREM
%VOL
Panel B:
(1982 Saml2le)
NUMBER
MEAN
SD
MEDIAN
MODE
MAX
MIN
RANGE
%COS
%POL
%PREM
%VOL
PERSIST"

Panel C:
(1972 Saml2le)
NUMBER
MEAN
SD
MEDIAN
MODE
MAX
MIN
RANGE
%COS
%POL
PERSIST*"

Table 2
Saml2le Characteristics
QTR
MON
SA
104
51.73%
0.97%
51.50%
52.00%
57.04%
50.50%
6.54%
100.00%
4.00%
4.00%
5.00%
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BANK

100
26.52%
0.73%
26.50%
26.50%
30.00%
25.50%
4.50%
96.15%
9.00%
8.00%
10.00%

34
9.22%
0.50%
9.00%
9.00%
10.65%
8.50%
2.15%
32.69%
17.00%
16.00%
11.00%

88
8.70%
0.23%
8.66%
8.50%
9.53%
8.30%
1.23%
84.62%
46.00%
39.00%
45.00%

SA

QTR

MON

BANK

181
51.48%
0.68%
51.25%
51.00%
55.72%
50.29%
5.43%
100.00%
7.00%
5.00%
7.00%
68.00%

181
26.35%
0.60%
26.25%
26.00%
30.00%
25.50%
4.50%
100.00%
12.00%
10.00%
12.00%
61.00%

113
9.07%
0.37%
9.00%
9.00%
11.00%
8.50%
2.50%
62.43%
8.00%
8.00%
6.00%
55.00%

152
8.61%
0.15%
8.60%
8.50%
9.11%
8.16%
0.95%
83.98%
43.00%
41.00%
42.00%
70.0%

MON

BANK

68
8.92%
0.28%
8.83%
8.75%
9.73%
8.53%
1.20%
87.18%
18.70%
61.00%

55
8.60%
0.19%
8.58%
8.50%
9.33%
8.33%
1.00%
70.51%
38.00%
72.00%

SA
78
51.39%
0.89%
51.00%
51.00%
54.93%
50.50%
4.43%
100.00%
6.10%
75.00%

QTR
78
26.14%
0.52%
26.00%
26.00%
28.23%
25.50%
2.73%
100.00%
12.40%
64.00%

* 1983-1984 25 month persistency rate.

,'* 1973-1974 25 month persistency rate.

ALLOT
16
8.67%
0.23%
8.67%
8.33%
9.14%
8.30%
0.84%
15.38%
NA
NA
NA
ALLOT
33
8.56%
0.24%
8.50%
8.50%
9.60%
8.30%
1.30%
18.23%
NA
NA
NA
NA

ALLOT
7
8.58%
0.12%
8.58%
8.50%
8.83%
8.50%
0.33%
8.97%
NA
NA
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For 1992, for example, excess premiums averaged 1.73 percent per
period (3.46 percent nominal annual rate) for the semiannual payment
mode and 1.52 percent per period (6.08 percent nominal annual rate)
for the quarterly mode. The 1992 per period (per annum) excess premiums for the regular monthly, bank draft, payroll deduction, and government allotment averaged 0.89 percent (10.64 percent), 0.37 percent
(4.4 percent), 0.37 percent (4.4 percent), and 0.34 percent (4.0 percent),
respectively. Thus, we see that carrying charges are smallest for semiannual and greatest for regular monthly business.
Standard deviations show that all variables are grouped tightly about
the mean and support the hypothesis that competitive factors tend to
drive the modal premium factors together. On the other hand, the
considerable range observed for some variables (for example the 6.54
percent for SA for 1992) indicates that practices of some firms differ
considerably from the industry average. Analysis of frequency distributions shows that simple modal premium factors are used most widely.
The most common SA factors for 1982 are 51 percent (N = 65), 52 percent (N = 43), and 51.5 percent (N = 24); for QTR for 1982 the most
common factors are 26 percent (N = 54) and 26.5 percent (N = 52).
Thus, most companies employ simple modal premium factors for ease
of agent use (and customer understanding).
Analysis of the various proportion measures shows that monthly
bank drafts are the most popular alternative to annual premium payment; 46 percent of the policies written in 1992 and 43 percent of the
policies written in 1982 specified this payment mode. The least popular payment mode for all years is payroll deduction. While all reporting
companies offer the SA payment mode and nearly all offer quarterly
payments, these modes are not particularly popular with consumers,
accounting for only 7 percent and 12 percent, respectively, of policies
written in 1982 and falling to 4 percent and 9 percent, respectively, for
1992. Regular monthly payments were the third most frequently offered mode in 1972, but fell behind monthly bank drafts in 1982, and
fell sharply in 1992. Monthly bank drafts were offered by 71 percent
of companies in 1972; this figure jumped to 84 percent in 1982 and to
85 percent in 1992.
For the 1973-1974 period the SA mode offered the best persistency
at 75 percent, followed closely by the BANK and SAL modes with 72
percent and 70 percent, respectively. The QTR and MON modes show
much worse persistency at rates of 64 percent and 61 percent, respectively. Given an annual persistency rate of 82 percent for this period,
we see that the SA mode provides the best relative persistency at 91.5
percent of annual, followed closely by BANK at 87.8 percent of annual
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and SAL at 85.4 percent of annual. QTR and MON demonstrate the
worst relative persistency at 78.1 and 74.4 percent respectively.
The best persistency rate for the 1983-1984 period was BANK at 70
percent, followed by SA, SAL, and QTR. The persistency rate for MON
drops to 55 percent, indicating that only slightly over half of the policies
specifying this mode paid the first modal premium in the third policy
year. Compared with the baseline annual persistency of 75 percent for
this later period, BANK provides the best relative persistency at 93.3
percent, followed by SA, SAL, and QTR at 90.1, 82.7, and 81.3 percent
of annual, respectively. Again, MON has the worst relative persistency
at only 73.3 percent of annual.
Panel A of Table 3 reports changes in the modal premium factor
means and standard deviations and in several proportional measures
over the period 1982-1992; Panel B reports similar data for the 19721982 interval. With the exception of the SAL and ALLOT variables for
1972-1982, we see increasing means for all modal premium factors
over the study period; the increases in the means for QTR and MON
for 1972-1982 and for SA, BANK, and SAL for 1982-1992 are statistically significant at the indicated levels. Thus, as a percentage of annual
premiums, companies are charging more for the option to not prepay
premiums. Standard deviations for three of the six modal premium factors increased for the 1972-1982 period, with statistically significant
increases in variability for MON and ALLOT. Statistically significant decreases in variability were observed, however, for SA and BANK. For
the 1982-1992 period, standard deviations increased for four of the
six modal premium factors, with statistically significant increases for
SA, MON, and BANK. We find then that even though the variation about
the mean for all modal premium factors was small, this variability generally increased over time. Thus, company differences in the costs of
deferred premiums appear to have become more important over the
period of this study.
Even though all companies offered the SA payment mode in each
year, it seldom was elected, accounting for only 6 percent of policies
written in 1972,7 percent in 1982, and 4 percent in 1992. The QTR option was only somewhat more popular, accounting for 12 percent, 12
percent, and 9 percent of policies in 1972,1982, and 1992, respectively.
In contrast to their practice for the SA mode, the proportion of companies offering the QTR mode declined significantly (Z = -2.00) over the
1982-1992 period. The MON option accounted for almost 19 percent
of policies in 1972, declined significantly (Z = -2.25) to 8 percent for
1982, but rebounded to a strong 17 percent of policies for policies in
1992.

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.2, 1994

230

Table 3
Changes in Sample Characteristics
(Tests of significance in parentheses)a
Panel A:
1992-1982
MEAN
SD
%COS
%POL
%PREM
%VOL

Panel B:
1982-1972
MEAN
SD
%COS
%POL
PERSISTb

SA
0.25%
(2.31)"
0.29%
(2.02)"
0.00%
NA
-3.00%
(-0.93)
-1.00%
(-0.34)
-2.00%
(-0.60)
SA
0.09%
(0.80)
-0.21%
(1.74)*
0.00%
NA
0.90%
(0.26)
-7.00%

QTR
0.17%
(1.94)
0.13%
(1.48)
-3.85%
(-2.00)"
-3.00%
(-0.69)
-2.00%
(-0.49)
-2.00%
(-0.45)
QTR
0.21%
(2.96)"
0.08%
(1.34)
0.00%
NA
-0.40%
(-0.09)
-3.00%

MON
0.15%
(1.58)
0.13%
(1.84)"
-29.74%
(-4.41)''''
9.00%
(1.94)
8.00%
(1.75)
5.00%
(1.27)
MON
0.15%
(3.13)*"
0.09%
(1.78)""
-24.75%
(-4.20*"
-10.70%
(-2.25)"
-6.00%

BANK
0.09%
(3.16)"
0.08%
(2.34)"
0.64%
(0.12)
3.00%
(0.43)
-2.00%
(-0.29)
3.00%
(0.43)
BANK
0.01%
(0.22)
-0.04%
(1.60)"
13.47%
(2.30)"
5.00%
(0.72)
-2.00%

SAL
0.13%
(2.11)*
-0.03%
(1.37)
-0.11%
(-0.02)
-1.00%
(-0.29)
-2.00%
(-0.65)
-1.00%
(-0.34)
SAL
-0.12%
(-1.22)
-0.02%
(1.20)
7.80%
(1.54)
2.00%
(0.60)
-8.00%

ALLOT
0.11%
(1.43)
-0.01%
(1.10)
-2.85%
(-0.54)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
ALLOT
-0.02%
(-0.34)
0.12%
(4.36)"
9.26%
(1.93)
NA
NA
NA

aThe test for change in variance is the F-test for equal variances. All other
tests of significance are two-tailed Z-tests.
"Significant at 5 percent level.
"*Significant at 1 percent level.
bBased on 1983-84 and 1973-74 25 month persistency data.
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The proportion of companies offering the MON mode declined significantly, however, (Z = -4.21 for 1972-82 and Z = -4.41 for 19821992) over the study period, from 87 percent in 1972 to only 33 percent in 1992. Thus, although the MON option has remained popular
with customers (and perhaps with agents), fewer and fewer companies
will write business on this basis. The percentage of policies specifying
the BANK payment mode increased from 38 percent in 1972 to 46 percent in 1992; likewise the proportion of companies offering this mode
increased from 71 percent in 1972 to 85 percent in 1992 (Z = 2.43).
The proportion of companies offering the SAL and ALLOT options increased substantially over the 1972-1982 period, but the percentage of
policies specifying these options remained small over the entire period
of study.
Panel B of Table 3 shows deteriorating persistency for all modes.
The persistency rate for the BANK payment mode declined the least;
BANK had the best persistency for the 1983-1984 period. The SAL
mode showed the worst deterioration, but the decline for SA and MON
was also relatively large. 4
BANK persistency showed a strong improvement to 93.3 percent of
annual policies. QTR also showed an improvement in relative persistency, while SA, SAL, and MON show deterioration in average persistency. The LIMRA figures are mean lapse rates averaged across a large
number of companies. It is important to bear in mind that individual
companies have specific sales practices and target markets that affect
their relative lapse rates by mode. Accordingly, differences in mean
lapse rates by mode cannot be attributed simply to modality itself.
It should be noted that the deterioration in persistency from the
1970s to the 1980s affected all modes of payment and was probably
largely occasioned by (i) the unattractiveness of fixed premium whole
life insurance in an environment in which market interest rates moved
strongly upwards, and (ii) the introduction of universal life, which was
used for many years as a replacement product for whole life insurance.
Most reporting companies include a clause regarding the disposition
of premiums paid beyond the death of the insured. The most common
clause stipulates that premiums beyond the month of death paid will
be refunded. Other common clauses call for refunding premiums paid
beyond the date of death or waiving of unpaid modal premiums beyond
the date of death with no refund mentioned. Table 4 shows the proportion of firms specifying each of these clauses for our sample years. The
4UMRA also reports that persistency rates for policies specifying annual premiums
declined from 82 percent for the 1973-1974 period to 75 percent for the 1983-1984
period.

232

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.2, 1994

proportion of firms offering to refund unearned premiums increased
from 61 percent in 1972 to 86 percent in 1992. In contrast to common
practice early in the century, few companies refuse to refund premiums paid beyond date or month of death or deduct modal premiums
due beyond the date (month) of death from the proceeds. As company
practices have changed from not refunding unearned premiums to refunding them, the companies have had to raise their annual premiums
to cover the additional cost. This change in company practice makes
the cost of the refund benefit in the year of death roughly equivalent
for all modes, including annual.
Table 4
Disposition of Unearned Premiums
1993 1983
37%
29%
Refund Beyond Date of Death
Refund Beyond Month of Death
49%
52%
Waive Beyond Date of Death
12%
18%
1%
No Premium Refund
2%
Unpaid Premiums Deducted
0%
0%

5

1973
18%
43%
38%
0%
1%

Related Consumer Issues

In calculating modal premium factors, the company must make provision for forgone interest, expense of billing and collection, and the
cost of whichever practice it follows regarding modal premiums in the
year of death. Thus, companies may use the different modal premium
factors to seek equity among policyholders in pricing modal premiums.
From the consumer's point of view, the modal premium factors are fixed
factors set by the company. The authors believe that consumers seldom
explicitly evaluate the extra cost of paying on a modal basis and that
when they do so, they think primarily in terms of interest rates (finance
charges). If the consumers were equipped to carry through the calculations on this Simplified view of the charges for modal premiums, we
think they would calculate the finance charge in the same way as the
internal rate of return is calculated in Table 5.
Table 5 is based on average premiums and average modal factor
data for 1992 and shows payment schedules for the SA, QTR, MON,
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Table 5
Internal Rates of Return (IRR)*
Mode Payment
IRR
ANN
1,032.0
00.00%
SA
533.65
14.85%
QTR
273.69
17.36%
MON
95.15
25.28%
9.86%
BANK
89.75

*Assuming premiums paid on time

and BANK payment modes. All cash flows are assumed to occur at the
beginning of the monthly periods shown. The internal rate of return
ORR) is calculated based on the implicit loan to the consumer and represents the effective cost to the consumer of not prepaying the annual
premium, i.e., paying a modal premium instead.
For example, for the SA mode in Table 5, the impliCit loan is the
$1,032 annual premium less the $533.85 prepaid or $498.15. The policyholder repays the loan with interest six months later with a payment
of $533.85. The cost to the consumer, stated as an annual return, is
14.85 percent. Obviously, when reviewed only in terms of financing
costs, if the consumer can borrow the $498.15 at a better rate than
that, he or she would be better off prepaying the annual premium.
The internal rates of return for the other modes are calculated in
the same fashion. The BANK mode (with an effective cost of only 9.86
percent) is the best buy; the MON mode (with an effective cost of 25.28
percent) is expensive. Most consumer credit readily available is at a
lower rate than this.
The issue we see is that the consumer finance charge calculation
above is flawed. (Mortality, lapse, and collection costs, all of which are
important to the insurer, are ignored. Table 6 shows how lapse rates
vary by premium payment.) These flaws in reasoning, however, are not
easy for consumers to grasp. Taken at face value, the implied finance
charges are at the high end of bank lending rates. They do not appear to
be consistent with other interest rates regularly quoted in life insurance
operations: rates in the cash value guarantees, rates currently credited
on universal life contracts, current rates impliCit in dividend scales,
rates credited on premiums paid in advance, rates charged on policy
loans, etc.
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Table 6
25-Month Persistency Rate
Mode 1973-1974 1983-1984
ANN
82%
75%
68%
SA
75%
QTR
64%
61%
MON
61%
55%
BANK
72%
70%
SAL
70%
62%
Source: LIMRA International

6

Summary and Conclusions

This study examines modal premium factors for a large sample of
life insurance companies over a 20 year period to determine the extent
of variability in modal premium factors at given points in time, how
industry practice has changed over time, and how variability in modal
premium factors has changed over time. Our analysis yields several
interesting conclusions.
The monthly bank draft is the dominant mode of payment, and has
gained an increasing share of policies written over time. 5 This is not
surprising when we consider that this mode has advantages for both
the policyholder and the company. The policyholder electing this mode
need not prepay the entire annual premium and does not need to mail
periodic payments. The company benefits from the improved persistency, relative to other non-annual modes, and lower transactions costs
characteristic of this mode. LIMRA reports for the 1984-1984 period
that the 25 month persistency rate for the BANK mode (70 percent) was
only slightly worse than that for the annual payment mode (75 percent).
Despite its relatively high transactions costs and poor persistency,
the regular monthly mode was surprisingly durable, accounting for 17
percent of policies written in 1992. Given that relatively few companies
offer the MON mode, this anomaly must be due to customer preferences or strong agency attitudes among these companies. (Even in 1992
the alternative monthly bank draft option was unavailable for users of
banking facilities that did not accept bank drafts and for those buyers
SWhile this study deals specifically with sales by ordinary agents, we find this result
to be tru~ for home sales as well.
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who did not use banking facilities at all.) Although widely available, the
semiannual and quarterly modes were used little. We find that some
companies have responded to the lack of interest in the QTR option by
dropping it from their offerings, but the universal availability of the SA
option is puzzling.
Analysis of the variability of the modal premium factors shows that
most firms set their modal premium factors within narrow limits of the
industry averages. Thus, we conclude that competitive pressures are
more important in determining modal premium factors than are company differences in transactions costs, forgone interest income, persistency, and mortality. This finding is interesting in the absence of
evidence that customers compare policies on this basis. We do observe
a tendency toward greater variability of modal premium factors across
time, however, indicating that divergent company costs have become a
more important consideration in recent years.
We further observe an increase in the average level of modal premium factors over time. This finding, combined with geometric increases in average annual premiums, shows that the companies probably are compensated better for the modal premium business today
than in 1972. 6 Alternatively, the cost to the consumer for the option
not to prepay premiums has increased. Average industry data indicate
that while persistency has deteriorated over the period of study, average mortality has improved. We observe no secular trend in average
earned interest income, and we speculate that transactions costs associated with modal premium collection have increased. Thus, we get a
mixed picture of the change in components over time. To the extent
that the rise in modal premium factors has outpaced associated costs,
companies increasingly are able to cover the costs of policies for which
premium collection is other than annual.
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Abstract*
Multi-regional insurance base premiums are customarily computed by a
top-down method where national or state projections are adjusted to reflect
regional differences. This paper proposes a methodology for a bottom-up projection. A weighing scheme that minimizes the variance of the estimator is
suggested as a criterion to establish an overall multi-regional rate.
Key words and phrases: ratemaking, loss severity, minimum variance, casualty
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own loss experience. 1 When the number of insureds within a class or
region is too small to rate accurately (without reference to a larger body
of data), the general approach is to use experience rating techniques, 2
of which credibility theory is a special case, to combine loss information
belonging to several classes and/or regions. If the data are combined,
this larger source of data can be used to determine the current year's
experience rated multi-class or multi-regional base pure premium. This
base pure premium then must be adjusted to reflect the previous year's
pure premium and class or regional differences. Credibility theory can
be used to decide on the relative weight to be placed on previous year's
pure premium versus this year's base pure premium. The objective of
this paper is to provide a way to calculate the current year's multi-class
or multi-regional base pure premium and not to decide the way that this
base pure premium has to be adjusted to produce a final pure premium
for each class or region.
The seminal work on the estimation techniques for premium rates
across class or territories was done by Bailey (1963). Bailey suggests
the calculation of territorial or class differential rates by iterative approximation to arrive at a set of estimates that provides the best fit
and to ensure fairness and equity. In addition, he recognizes and gives
formulation to the additive relativities at higher levels of classification
to modify basic rates.
A comprehensive study of pricing in the state of Illinois was conducted by Witt (1979) to discover whether the rate intended to cover
loss costs, expenses, and underwriting profit margins is adequate and
at the same time equitable to consumers. This concern for equity was
addressed further by Chang and Fairly (1978, 1979), who discuss the
traditional multiplicative and the closely associated log-linear methods.
They find both are biased toward some drivers when applied to the State
of Massachusetts. They suggest using an additive procedure that they
claim would eliminate biases and improve overall accuracy.
Subsequently, Fairley, Tomberlin, and Weisberg (1981), in their study
of pricing in New Jersey, address the issues of the merits and drawbacks
of the multiplicative and additive methods. They point out that typically only a single state is used during a single period. They recommend
the inclusion of more regions and time periods, in a scheme that they
demonstrate for the years 1975, 1976, and 1977.
1 Anti-trust considerations in the future may require companies to use their own
data in all but the most extreme situations.
2For an overview of experience rating and credibility theory, see, for example,
Daykin, Pentikii.inen, and Pesonen (1994, pp. 179-189) or Venter (1990, Chapter 7).
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In a more recent article, Brown (1988) provides a clear summary
description of the multiplicative and the additive approaches. He explains that a driver's rate by the multiplicative approach is obtained by
BRm XXi xYj, while forthe same driver the rate would be BRa + (Xi +Yj),
using the additive approach (where BRm and BRa are base rates for the
multiplicative and the additive portion, respectively, and Xi and Yj are
the adjustments, such as the class and driving record of the insured).
The difference between the two methods may be simply stated as percents versus cents adjustments. Brown goes on to suggest the use of
the generalized linear models approach for estimating the components
of the multiplicative as well as the additive versions.
The traditional approach in multi-regional ratemaking is excellently
summarized by Finger (1990) who provides a variety of examples. The
traditional multi-regional approach relies on an iterative procedure employing regional and class relativities to adjust the pure premium for
each region. A final iteration that uses base exposures instead of earned
exposures produces a convergent rate for all regions and all classes that
accurately may represent the historical experience. Note that both regional and class relativities are employed simultaneously to produce
a convergent base rate; these, in turn, are adjusted further for higher
levels of classification when appropriate.
McClenahan (1990, Chapter 2) believes that the traditional approach
of finding a state-wide average rate that subsequently is distributed, using territorial relativities, among the various territories within the state
and then, using classifications relativities, among the classes within
each territory has worked fairly well in practice.
Excellent comparative assessments of alternative approaches available for predicting multi-regional premiums are provided by Sant (1980),
Weisberg and Tomberlin (1982), Weisberg, Tomberlin, and Chatterjee
(1984), and lee (1989). lee also makes an important contribution by
classifying the methodologies according to the functional form of the
model and estimation method. The methods of most relevance to this
research are those based directly on observed pure premium data, in
contrast to those that divide the observed data into frequency and
severity components. 3
3 According to Finger (1990) the pure premium approach, because it requires more
information and also can produce frequency, severity and pure premium relativities,
is more accurate than the loss ratio method. Under the loss-ratio method, incurred
losses are divided by earned premiums; under the pure premium method, incurred
losses are divided by number of exposures. Interestingly, Brown (1993) shows that
the loss ratio and pure premium methods are algebraically equivalent when used in
calculating classification differentials and for changing the average portfolio rate.
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2 Objectives
The purpose of this paper is to present a statistical method for estimating multi-regional base premiums for a particular line of insurance:
automobile physical damage coverage. Here we have insureds who are
in the same class, but who are located in more than one territory or
region. The multi-regional base premium is the total dollar amount of
claims spread over the whole number of insured persons. The focus is
only on that portion of the pure premium that is directly attributable
to claims. Neither profit nor expense margins are included in the rate.
In its final form, however, the base rate can be adjusted to include a
risk margin to ensure that the probability of the total claims exceeding
the funds generated by the base premium is less than some specified
quantity, such as 5 percent or 1 percent. 4 This margin will compensate
for the variability of the underwriting risk.
The contribution this paper makes is in the implicit use of a sampling prototype methodology akin to stratified sampling, employing
observed data to estimate a basic rate that can be adjusted by either
multiplicative or additive factors. According to Deming (1950, p. 213),
in stratified sampling, random samples are drawn from a universe divided into separate strata or classes. The purpose of stratification is to
find out what properties of the various classes govern the variance of
the estimate of the mean of the entire universe. Furthermore, it is desired that the estimator be efficient (minimum variance). In this paper,
the sampling universe is divided into separate strata by the geographic
location (called regions) of drivers. The concern then is to find an overall linearly weighted mean that has the minimum variance.
What remains to be defended next is the assumption that the claims
resulting from automobile accidents and by implication, pure premiums, constitute random samples. Support for this assumption comes
from Darnell and Evans (1990, p. 13) who explain that the conditions
of the world within which data are generated are outside the control
of the investigator and therefore do not satisfy the foundation of the
classical probability model that requires the assumption of repeated
experiments. Economists and social scientists almost exclUSively deal
with data generated outside such an experimental context.
Darnell and Evans explain that observed economic variables may
be treated as if resulting from a single drawing from a population. s
4When risk margins are determined in this manner, the resulting premium is called
a percentile premium (Gerber 1979, Chapter 5).
sIt is precisely this type of argument that Butler (1993) puts forth in an interesting
article in which he proposes the usc of car-mile exposure rather than car-year as a basis

Nissan and Hamwi: Predicting Automobile Premiums

241

An advantage of a sampling prototype is that the observations need
not follow any particular probability distribution such as, for example,
when regression models are employed.
In regression models, the error terms depend on many factors including omission of explanatory variables, model specification, aggregation of variables, and functional misspecifications. The combined
effects of these factors may render the coefficients of the least squares
regression not to be most efficient because they may lead to false conclusions in hypothesis testing. For example, Brown (1988) mentions the
exponential family of probability distributions, each with specific estimators that must be determined from a sample. Similarly, the procedure suggested by Chang and Fairly (1978,1979) uses regression models that assume the error term follows the customary requirement of
normal distribution. Such distributional assumptions are not binding
in sampling. With a sufficiently large number of observations, as common in practice, there is good reason to assume, according to Cochran
(1953), that the estimators of population parameters such as the mean
are approximately normally distributed.
The method proposed in this paper differs from other techniques
advocated for multi-regional rate prediction because it uses information on the mean and variance of loss severity for many regions and
for several prior years. It uses a minimum-variance criterion to assign
yearly weights for regions.

3 The Model
Consider an insurer that sells automobile physical damage coverage
to several classes of insureds. Each class of insureds consists of policyholders spread over several regions. It is assumed that the claims
generated by a single class of insureds in the same region and the same
year are mutually independent and have identical policies.
The following notation is used throughout this paper:
For i = 1, ... ,L andj = 1, ... ,K, let us define:
K
L
nij

Nij

Number of regions, K = 1, 2, ... ;
Number of years, L = 1,2, ... ;
Number of claims in year i and region j;
Number of insureds in year i and region j;

of pricing and explains that in the Bailey and Simon (1959, 1960) model, automobile
accidents can be envisioned as a random sampling of the class population on the road.
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Observed claim severity from the kth claim
in year i and region j, for k =: 1,2, ... nij;
1

nij

nij

k=l

- L Xijk
E[Xij ]

=:

observed average claim severity;

J.lij;
1
~
- 2
---1 L.... (Xijk - Xij)
nij - k=l

observed variance of claim severity;

E[ST)

2

(Tij'

1

flij

- L Xijk
E[Pij]

Nij
nij

=:

Observed pure premium;

k=l

.

j\[:J.lij,
I)

Weight for year i and region j,
Weight for year i, bi ;:::: 0 ; and
Weight for region j, Wj ;:::: O.

aij ;::::

0; and

Note that for each year, the aij weights sum to one, i.e.,
while Ii bi =: 1 and Ij Wj =: 1.
Clearly, the variance of Xij for year i and region j is
2
(Tij

_

Var[Xi']
)

Ij aij

=:

1

(1)

-

nij

while the variance of the observed pure premium per insured is
-

Var[Pij]

nij

=:

2

N~(Tij .

(2)

I)

The multi-regional base premium for year L + 1, Pel + 1), is determined by a linear combination of all of the observed pure premiums
Pij (across all regions and for the preceding L years). Thus P(L + 1) can
be written in its most general form as
L K

pel + 1)

=:

L L CijPij

(3)

i=l j=l

where the cijs are general nonnegative weights that sum to one. In
Section 4 we will describe procedures for choosing the weights.
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Determination of Base Premiums

4.1

Independent Regions

The assumption of statistical independence among regions can be
defended on the grounds that regions are physically separate and, therefore, what occurs in one region will have no bearing on what occurs in
another region. Except in certain infreqlJ.ent occurrences like highway
pile-ups and natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes, it is unlikely for automobile physical damages to be statistically dependent
events. Furthermore, independence assumption routinely is made in
many statistical studies for the sake of simplicity. Another assumption
that is made is that the group of insureds is homogeneous. According to Tiller (1990, p. 91), "While homogeneity is the goal of manual
ratemaking, it is not usually possible to achieve."
In the case where insureds come from the same class but are located
in different territories, however, there is greater degree of homogeneity
among them in terms of expectation of loss than among insureds who
belong to different classes and different territories. When, in one year,
a group of insureds can be considered homogeneous for the purpose of
auto physical damage coverage, such homogeneity is likely to continue
over time.
To assign proper weights aij to each region, let h be the weighted
observed pure premiums across regions for year i, i.e.,
K

h

=

L aijPij,

for i

=

1, ... ,L,

(4)

j=l

where L.j aij = 1, j = 1, ... , K. Under the independence assumption,
its variance is given by
K

-

'\'

2 nij 2
a ij - 2 O'ij'
j=l
N ij

Var[Pd = L..

f or t' = 1, ... ,L.

(5)

In a similar manner, mUlti-regional base premium for year L + 1,

P(L + 1), is defined as a weighted average of the h s by assigning weights
bi such that

,L bi =

1. It follows that
L

P(L + 1)

= L..
'\'
j=l

b·P·
1 1.,

(6)
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with mean and variance given by

Var[P(L

L

K

n"

i=l

j=l

Nij

L b i L aij~J1ij

E[P(L+l)]

~ b i2l~
2nij 2]
L aij N 2 , (Jij .

+ 1)]

L

1=1

)=1

(7)
(8)

I)

It should be noted that both nij and Nij are treated as given constants
rather than random variables as is done in some models. 6 Here, it is assumed that in each year the population Nij is fixed, and a corresponding
sample nij is drawn.
Consider the linear estimator given in equation (4). Its estimated
variance is given by:
K

-

est. Var[Pd

'\' 2 nij 2
= L aij-2 sij .
j=l

Nij

By the constraint imposed on the weights whereby
eliminate aiK to get
K-1

-

est. Var[Pd

L.j aij =

1, we can

K-1

'\'
2 nij 2
= L aij-2 sij
j=l
Nij

+ (1

-

'\'
2 niK 2
L aij) - 2 SiK'
j=l
NiK

(9)

Differentiating equation (9) with respect to aij, for j = 1, ... , K - 1 and
setting each of the K - 1 equations equal to zero to satisfy the first
order condition for minimization yields the following linear system of
equations: for j = 1,2, ... ,K-l
K-1
niK 2 '\'
- 2 SiK L a i r
NiK
r=l

nij

2

+ aij-2 Sij

niK 2
= - 2 SiK'

Nij

(10)

NiK

In spite of its initial appearance, the set of equations (10) easily can
be solved by simple row operations. Let
nij 2
(Xij = - 2 Sij'
Nij

It easily can be proved that the solution to the system of equations (10)
is
at = (XiK
)

(Xij

(1

1

+ Ki

(XiK)-l

for j

=

1,2, ... ,K-l

(11)

j=l (Xij

6Mercer (1985), Stroinski and Currie (1989), and Langford and Capella (1994) use
models where nij and Nij are treated as random variables.
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*
aij'

Note that the matrix of coefficients of the aijs arising from the system of equations (10) is positive definite, and by implication it is strictly
convex. Hence, the second order condition for global minimum is assured. That is, the arjS do minimize est. Var[l\]; see Hadley (1964, pp.
83-93).
The discussion thus far has been limited to obtaining the regional
weights for the yearly averages of premiums. To establish a criterion by
which the yearly weights bi in equation (6) are chosen, information from
several prior years is utilized. This is in line with Jee (1989) who suggests the incorporation of trends in the projected estimate. A scheme
that fulfills this suggestion is one that uses the standardized ratio of
consecutive observed yearly means as follows: let
{3I = 1 and {3i =

ph ,

for i

=

2, ... ,L.

1-1,.

The yearly weights b i are determined as
bi

=

!i {3i

fori=1,2, ... ,L.

(12)

Li=I

The rate-maker may use other weighing schemes. For example, the
rate-maker can recognize the full effect of inflation by adjusting prior
years' observed premiums by an appropriate cost index. In the case
of automobile physical damage, for example, the index for repair costs
would be an appropriate choice. On the other hand, if the rate-maker
wants to attach greater importance to the more recent experience, a
weighting scheme that assigns larger weights to more recent years than
to earlier years is appropriate.
An empirical example to demonstrate the computations is provided
in the appendix. The example pertains to automobile physical damage
coverage. The procedure can be applied to other insurance coverages,
however, with similar aspects.

4.2

Dependent Regions

Suppose that after a series of statistical tests that measure the degree of statistical association for bivariate data'? it is found that the regions are dependent. Then, following Cardoso (1993), we can compute
7See, for example, Rohatgi (1984, pp. 762-771) or Sachs (1984, Chapter 5) for examples of such tests.
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a projected multi-regional base premium by using the past annually observed pure premiums for each of the K regions. This ensures that the
spatial dependencies among regions are considered because all regions
may be affected by the same economic factors as well as changes in
accident frequency. A procedure that takes regional dependency into
account not only requires the K regional pure premium means and variances. but also requires the computation of the covariances between the
(~) regional pairs.
The following are the suggested steps:
Step 1: Tabulate the Pijs and their mean and variance across the years.
A schematic representation of the set of data is given in Table 1.
Table 1
Yearly Pure Premiums By Region
RegionK
Region 1 Region 2
Year
1
Pll
Pl2
PIK
2
P21
P22
P2K
L

PLl

PL2

PLK

Mean
Variance

p. I
v I2

p. 2

p. K

VR

2
V2

Step 2: Compute the means. variances. and correlation coefficients for
j.k = 1..... K:

p. j

(13)

=

(14)

Vjj

Vjk

for j

=

'* k;

(15)

Step 3: The projected multi-regional base premium is obtained as a linear combination of the separate K regional means
K

P(L + 1)

=

2: wjP.j
j~l

(16)
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with observed variance estimated by
K

est. Var[P]

K-I

= "
L 2
WjVj2
j=I

K

+2 "
L "
L

VjmWjW m .

(17)

j=I m=j+I

Step 4: Derive the set of weights {wn that minimize equation (17)
subject to the condition 2:~=I wj = l. Let Y be the variancecovariance matrix given by
Y= {vij} for i,} = 1,2,oo.,K,
and w be the column vector of weights {w j}. Our problem is as
follows:
K

min wTyw subject to

L Wj =

l.

j=I

Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, we have
minL

=

wTyw - A(wTl - 1)

where 1 is a column vector of Is. Differentiating L with respect
to the WjS and the A and then setting these derivatives to zero
yields:
2
V1
V21

VI2

V~

VIK
V2K

-1
-1

WI
W2

0
0
(18)

2

VKl

VK2

VK

-1

1

1

1

0

wK

A

0
1

Once the variances and correlations have been calculated, the system of equations (18) can be solved using standard numerical
methods such as Cramer's Rule or Gaussian elimination; see, for
example, Burden and Faires (1985, Chapter 6). See the appendix
for an example.
If any of the W j s found is negative, then we must solve the system of equations given in equation (17) subject to the following
additional constraints: Wj ;::: 0, for} = 1,2, 00. ,K. This is now a
basic quadratic programming problem. s
8For more on quadratic programming see Rao (1978, Chapter 12.4). In addition,
there is commercial software available through International Mathematical Subroutine
Library (IMSL), Visual Numerics, Inc., Houston, Tex., to solve quadratic programming
problems.
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As an alternative to quadratic programming, we can derive approximate minimum variance weights based on those
that
were derived in equation (11). Define the regional weights as

aus

L

Wj=

a*.

"')
LT'

(19)

i=l

These weights then are used in equation (16) to determine the
overall base premium.
An empirical example to demonstrate the procedures outlined above
is provided in the appendix.

5 Advantages of Proposed Methodology
The approach discussed in Section 4 and the accompanying empirical examples of the appendix are beneficial in a variety of ways as
outlined below:
• The calculated overall base rate can be used as an alternative indication in credibility considerations. As explained by McClenahan
(1990), a credibility-weighted indication is desirable when a rate is
less than fully credible. Thus, for instance, if a rate for a specific
class is established by a traditional (manual) method, which, in
the assessment of the actuary, is not fully credible, then a complementary rate may be advisable in computing a credibility-weighted
indication.
• When trending pure premiums, the most commonly used models according to Cardoso (1993) are the linear model given by
P = a + bt and the exponential or log-linear model given by
P = ae bt , where a and b are constant and t is a time trend.
In either case, however, the data used to calculate the pure premium may contain significant serial correlation, making tests of
hypotheses for the significance of the regression coefficients invalid (Dougherty, 1992). In our method, this correlation is used
in Section 4.2 to project a base rate for year L + 1 instead of using
a linear trend equation.
• Our proposed method also can be used to calculate an overall
average rate for several territories, regardless of the number of
classes included in each territory.
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• The suggested approach, for the case of dependence (see Section
4.2), takes into account the variation existing within and among
regions through variances and covariances, while in the case of
independence (see Section 4.1) it takes into account only withinregional varia.tion through variances. In both cases, the variation
is embodied in the final rate through the regional weights.

6 Summary
A statistical method has been presented for estimating a multiregional base premium rate for a class of insureds who are located in
different regions. When all of the regions are incorporated in the analysis, the method generates a country-wide rate for a particular class of
insureds. Of course, in some insurance lines the grouping of risks into
separate regional schedules is as important in the interest of equity as
grouping them into different classifications, as pointed out recently by
Harrington and Doerpinghaus (1993). Nonetheless, we have focused
only on determining an average class rate for all regions combined.
The prevailing practice has been to develop a state-wide rate that
is subsequently adjusted using relativities first among the various regions within the state and then among the classes within each region.
In contrast, the proposed method finds a multi-regional class rate first
that later can be adjusted to reflect any possible regional differences in
loss experience. With respect to automobile physical damage insurance,
members of the same class who are located in different geographic areas are likely to represent a more homogeneous group than those who
belong to different classes within the same region. Homogeneity imparts statistically reliable experience that should allow for the determination of a fairly accurate rate. Interclass subsidies, characteristic of
the current system (particularly between rural and city dwellers), would
be minimized, if not eliminated, because the proposed method starts
with a multi-regional class rate. This bypasses the step of having to
calculate an overall state-wide rate for all classes.
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Appendix: An Empirical Example
Tables AI, A2 and A3 show the data supplied by an insurance company for nine years (L := 9) and for regions denoted by I, 2, and 3
respectively (K := 3). These data are used to illustrate the procedures
outlined in the paper. For each region, the data given are the number
of claims (nij), the number of exposures (Nij), the average collision
claim (Cij), the standard deviation of claims (sij), and the pure premium (Pij).

Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mean

Table Al
Summary Data for Region I
Region 1 (Indianapolis and Gary, Indiana)
C1
nl
Nl
Sn
Pl
411 1,279 735 1,411
236.19
2l3.70
398 1,462 785 1,562
364 1,518 867 1,635
207.90
447 1,618 855 1,880
236.21
464 1,505 856 1,703
263.91
190.48
260 1,107 811 1,642
178
924
828 1,618
159.51
181
798
815 1,536
184.86
168
828
819 1,658
166.17
206.55

Source: Data from a major automobile insurance company
for unmarried, male principle operators under 21.

Table A4 shows the derived weights aij (from equation (11)), b i
(from equation (12)), the yearly averages Pi (from equation (4)), and
the estimated variance Var[Pi ] (from equation (5)). Substituting the
information from Tables AI, A2, A3 and A4 into equations (6) and
(8) yields, under the assumption of independence (See Section 4.1),
P(lO) := 196.24 and estimated Var[P(lO)] := 7.24.
Let R()( be the 100lX% upper confidence limit of multi-regional premium, then for say lX := 0.05 and the normal approximation, the esti-
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Table A2
Summary Data for Region 2
Region 2 (Los Angeles and San Francisco, Calif.)
P2
n2
N2
C2
Si2
1,240
752
1,601
5,690
163.88
2,007 9,512
1,663
794
167.53
1,969 9,797
861
1,833
173.04
2,319 10,215
941
1,906
213.63
2,302
9,671
948
1,920
225.65
1,859 9,297
1,049 1,941
209.76
1,779 8,312
980
1,917
209.75
1,274
2,000
6,566
909
176.37
1,259 6,769
956
2,036
177.81
190.73

Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mean

Source: Data from a major automobile insurance company
for unmarried, male principle operators under 21.

mated projected (year 10) mUlti-regional premium rate is
Ro.os

=

196.24 + 1.645 x ·J7.24

=

200.67.

Under the assumption of dependence (See Section 4.2), the use of Lagrange's multipliers for equations (17) results in the following weights:

wi

= -0.053,

wI

wI

= 0.433 and

= 0.620.

Because one of the weights is negative (WI in this case), quadratic programming is used to produce the solution

wi

= 0.0,

wI

= 0.448 and

wI

= 0.552.

Substituting the quadratic programming solution into equations (16)
and (17) yields the projected base premium P(10) = 201.19, the estimated Var[P(10)] = 57.57, and the estimated projected (year 10)
multi-regional premium rate
Ro.os

=

201.19 + 1.645 x .J57.57

=

213.67.

The third alternative, using average regional weights, as suggested
by equation (19), gives the following weights:

wi

= 0.117,

wI

= 0.734 and

wI

= 0.149,
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Year

Table A3
Summary Data for Region 3
Region 3 (Rural Mississippi)
n3
N3
C3
Si3
P3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

379
435
448
671
582
405
313
313
323

1,592
1,842
1,907
2,906
2,464
1,940
1,641
1,398
1,844

875
846
891
977
1,061
964
1,018
1,004
986

1,772
1,861
1,868
1,945
1,963
2,020
2,203
1,893
2,135

Mean

208.31
199.79
209.32
225.59
250.61
201.25
194.17
224.79
172.71
209.61

Source: Data from a major automobile insurance company
for unmarried, male principle operators under 21.

giving .PoO) = 195.46 and the estimated Var[.POO)] = 47.18. Note
that this alternative produces a variance that is smaller than the variance obtained by quadratic programming. These variances, however,
should not be compared because as equation (19) does not use the covariances while the variance obtained by quadratic programming does.
The estimated projected (year 10) multi-regional premium rate is
RO.05 =

195.46 + 1.645 x .J47.18

=

206.76.

z
In
In

TableA4
Regional Weights, Yearly Weights, and Multi-Regional Base Premium

III
::J
III
::J

c..

ail*

a i'"2

a i3*

bi

1

0.140

0.712

0.149

0.111

180.59

69.86

20.05

2

0.106

0.785

0.109

0.108

175.93

48.18

19.00

.,

3

0.123

0.756

0.121

0.115

181.74

52.08

20.90

....n

4

0.095

0.713

0.192

0.133

218.07

57.57

29.00

\.D

5

0.109

0.715

0.176

0.119

234.22

64.89

27.87

....c0

6

0.107

0.754

0.139

0.098

206.51

61.10

20.24

7

0.129

0.746

0.125

0.108

201.30

70.56

21.74

8

0.128

0.723

0.149

0.102

184.67

85.52

18.84

9

0.118

0.698

0.184

0.106

175.50

79.53

18.60

Year

PI.

Var[fU

b·xP
I
l.

:c
III

3

~.

""0

IP

c..

::J

»

3

0
0IP

""0
.,
IP
3

c

3

In

Mean

0.117

0.734

$196.24

0.149

Source: Based on calculations from Tables Al to A3.
Notes: a'ij is the regional weight for year i and region} and is found from equation (ll); bi is the weight for year i and is
found from equation (12);

11. is the calculated from equation (4);

and Var[I1.l is calculated using equation (5).
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Abstract
This paper develops a three dimensional statistical approach to the estimation of the mean and the standard deviation of pure incurred but not reported
(IBNR) reserves. This means that the time of occurrence, the reporting lag, and
the claim severity are separately modeled. It is assumed that, beyond any fixed
time t, the claim number development process is Poisson and that the severity
of loss depends on the length of the reporting lag. Two key assumptions are
made to simplify the eS,timation of model parameters: for a given reporting lag,
(i) the conditional mean of the claim size is a linear function of the reporting
lag, and (ii) the conditional coefficient of variation of the severity is constant.
Key words and phrases: stochastic loss development, reporting lag, pure IBNR,
conditional distributions, loss reserves

1

Introduction

The development of losses over time is a key problem for both pricing and loss reserving actuaries. Commensurate with the importance
of the problem, there is a large body of actuarial literature (primarily
property/casualty, but also health insurance) devoted to loss development.
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In a general textbook on loss reserve estimation, Salzmann (1964)
details eight general methods of estimating loss reserves. Each method
generally involves relatively simple projections of future loss development from aggregate triangulations of historical data. The methods
described in Salzmann are purely deterministic and do not have an explicit mathematical model as an underlying framework. In the 30 years
since the Salzmann text was published, these methods have been refined by actuaries and are still widely used today. A basic discussion
and documentation of such methods is found in Wiser (1990).
For many years, however, actuaries have recognized two needs of
modeling the loss development process: (i) a need to facilitate and improve the estimation process with the application of stochastic models, and (ii) a need to measure probable variations in future loss development. McClenahan (1975), for example, constructs a deterministic
model of paid loss development for "analysis of the effects upon reserve
adequacy of changes in various exogenous variables and in the testing
of the established reserves on a prospective basis." Stanard (1985) simulates loss development triangles under a hypothetical stochastic frequency/severity model to "measure the expected value and variance of
prediction errors of four simple methods of estimating loss reserves."
Guiahi (1986) develops a model for IBNR estimation as a stochastic
process using the number of claims, severity of claims, and reporting
lag to develop the mean and variance of IBNR reserves. In his paper,
however, Guiahi assumes that reporting lag and loss severity are independent. This assumption, while convenient, is highly unlikely to be
valid for most sets of insurance loss data. It is also likely to produce
inadequate IBNR estimates if loss severity increases significantly with
reporting lag. Pinto and Gogol (1987) analyze excess loss development
by layer using Pareto distributions fitted to casualty loss distributions.
Wright (1992) provides an extensive and highly detailed treatment of
estimating future paid losses from separate development triangles of
loss counts and loss amounts using generalized linear models. Wright
deals with many of the issues addressed in this paper in a similar and
detailed manner. I recommend Wright's paper to the interested reader.
It should not be inferred from this short list of papers that there is
a paucity of literature on the subject. For example, van Eeghen (1981)
presents a comprehensive review of the earlier literature on loss reserving. Taylor (1986) provides a detailed description of the component parts of loss development models. More recently, in the 1994
Spring CAS Forum, for example, there are ten papers devoted to the
measurement of variability in loss reserves. There is, however, a need
for practical models that readily can be used by practicing actuaries.
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For some types of insurance, loss development is sufficiently shorttailed or stable enough to allow relatively simple projections from paid
or incurred loss triangles. The development patterns for some coverages, however, are long-tailed and unstable over time. For these coverages, traditional aggregate triangulations or frequency/severity studies
may not provide development data of sufficient credibility to reveal the
true nature and magnitude of underlying development patterns.
Loss reserves include:
• Case estimates on reported losses;
• Reserves for additional development on reported losses; and
• Amounts carried to reflect liability for losses incurred but not yet
reported (lBNR).
This paper addresses the third component, IBNR, of the total loss reserve. The view of IBNR taken here is that of Bornhuetter-Ferguson 1
type methods, which postulate that IBNR is independent of prior loss
activity and may be expressed as a function of expected losses and time.
The expected losses are a function of expected loss counts and expected severity of loss. Thus, it makes sense to look at the development
of both frequency and severity over time. The key variables in the emergence of reported loss counts are the occurrence date and the report
date, each represented on a time line with the beginning of the accident
year set equal to time zero and all subsequent dates represented as the
time elapsed from the beginning of the accident year to the respective
date. The time, Z, elapsed between the occurrence date and report date
will be referred to throughout this paper as the continuous reporting
lag.
The first task is to identify a reasonable representation of the underlying severity of loss distribution for the losses in general. [See Hogg
and Klugman (1984) for a thorough discussion of choosing loss distributions.] The size of loss, however, may be a function of the reporting
lag Z defined above. For each value of Z there may be separate loss
distributions referred to as conditional distributions to distinguish them
from the marginal loss distribution.
The final component of IBNR development is the manner in which
claim occurrences arise over an exposure period. The most common assumption is that occurrence dates are uniformly distributed throughout
the accident year; this assumption is adopted in this paper. It should
I Bornhuetter-Ferguson type methods are loss reserving methods that are based on
the work of Bornhuetter and Ferguson (1972).
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be noted, however, that the results of this paper easily can be extended
to include a more general claim occurrence distribution.
This three dimensional approach to modeling the loss development
process (occurrence of loss, loss count development, and loss severity)
is the framework for the model developed in this paper. Note that the
primary data to be used in the model development need not be limited to loss triangulations. When such triangulations are highly volatile
and involve a limited number of claims, a compilation of each individual claim by accident date and reporting date may facilitate the actual
modeling process.

2 The Mathematical Model
Following Guiahi (1986), IBNR will be modeled as a three dimensional stochastic process based on the number of claims, severity of
claims, and reporting lag. The assumption of independence between
reporting lag and loss severity, however, will be discarded and replaced
with a model describing the dependence structure between these two
variables using conditional mean severities.
The time interval (0,1) is assigned to the accident year. There are
three basic random variables: occurrence date X, reporting date R, and
size of loss S. A fourth random variable, denoted by Z, is the continuous reporting lag and is defined as Z = R - X. Table 1 summarizes the
notation that will be used in connection with the variables X, Z, and S.
Table 1
Definition of Random Variables
Variable
Space PDF Mean Variance
X = Time of Occurrence
(0,1) u(·)
1/2
Z = Continuous Lag
(0, ex:»
9 (.)
m
S = Loss Size
(0, ex:»
f(·)
J1
Note: Space = Sample Space; and PDF = Probability Density Function.
In the most general model, the three random variables (S, Z, X)
would be interdependent. It does seem likely, however, that the length
of the reporting lag should not depend on the occurrence date. That
is, Z and X should be independent in the statistical sense. It is not
clear, however, that Sand Z or S and X need be independent pairs.
If there is a significant underlying loss trend by accident date, then S
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and X should be dependent. It is well-known that loss size tends to increase with settlement lag, and it may be true that loss size also tends
to increase with reporting lag. 2 If so, then Sand Z also will be dependent. Put another way, trend may have a two dimensional effect on loss
size. The first dimension is the effect of trend on loss size by accident
date, and the second is trend over time elapsed since accident date.
In some cases, however, underlying trend in either dimension may be
either nonexistent or extremely difficult to establish or quantify. This
may be true, for example, in some liability coverages where large losses
playa significant role.
In this paper, the assumption is made that there is no trend on loss
size by accident date within an accident year. For any given accident
year, loss size and accident date are assumed to be independent. Moreover, as has been previously stated, the uniform distribution of occurrences assumption often will be appropriate. It follows that S is dependent only upon the continuous lag Z.
Let J.1k (z) be the kth conditional mean of [S I Z = z], Le.,
J.1k(Z) = E[Sk

IZ

= z],

for k

and let the coefficient of variation of [S I Z
Assuming that g(z) ~ 0, it follows that

=

=

1,2, ... ,
z] be denoted by

J.1I (z)
J.12 (z) - (J.1(z))2
u(z)
J.1(z) .

(1)
cp(z).

(2)
(3)
(4)

The density g(z) describes how loss counts will develop over time.
Although other forms are possible, it is common to assume that ultimate claim frequency is either Poisson, negative binomial, or binomial;
see Panjer and Willmot (1992, Chapter 6). In this case, however, I will
assume that the ultimate number of claims is a Poisson random variable. In addition, given any fixed point in time t ~ 0, the number of
counts reported after time t is assumed to be Poisson.
At this point, the basic assumptions used to develop the model are
listed:
Assumption 1: The conditional mean J.1(z) is a linear function of z. In
particular,
J.1(z) = K(z-m) +J.1.
(5)
2This relationship between loss size and settlement lag dates back at least as far as
Salzmann (1964, pages 5-6).
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Note that a linear function is used for convenience, but it is used
only after it became apparent that more complex models would
not provide a superior fit.
Assumption 2: The coefficient of variation of [S I Z
dent of z, and hence is a constant c, i.e.,
cp(z) =

=

z] is indepen-

c.

(6)

Assumption 3: The continuous reporting lag Z has known probability
density function g(z) and has mean m and variance (.
Assumption 4: The number of claims and time of reporting are independent.
Assumption 5: Claim occurrences within the accident year are uniformly
distributed on (0,1).
Assumption 6: Loss size S and lag Z are independent of the time of
occurrence X.
Assumption 7: Given a fixed time t, the number of counts reported
after time t, N(t), has a Poisson distribution with mean and variance denoted by A(t). Clearly, the aggregate ultimate loss count
is Poisson with mean and variance given by A(O).
One consequence of Assumptions 1 and 2 is the following:
£[S2]

= /1 2 + (52 =

(1

+ C2)(K2(2 + m 2).

(7)

Equation (7) can be established easily as follows:
£[£[S2

I Z]] from Bowers et al. (1986, eqn. (2.2.10))

£[/12 (Z)]
£[(/1(Z))2 + (52(Z)]

+ c 2 )£[ (/1 (Z)) 2] from Assumption 2
(1 + C2 )£[(K(Z - m) + m)2] from Assumption 1
(1 + C 2 )(K2(2 + m 2 ).
(1

3

The Main Results

Now fix a time t > 0, and let Si(t) denote the size of the ith claim
reported after time t. If IBNR(t) denotes total loss dollars reported
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after time t, then
N(tl

IBNR(t)

L 5i(t).

=

(8)

i=l

From Bowers et al. (1986, Chapter 11) or Panjer and Willmot (1992,
Chapter 6), IBNR(t) is a compound Poisson random variable under the
assumption that the number of claims and the loss sizes are mutually
independent random variables. The mean and variance of IBNR(t) are
thus given by
E[IBNR(t)]

=

i\(t)E[5i(t)]

Var[IBNR(t)]

=

i\(t)E[5f(t)].

(9)
(10)

The problem of estimating the mean and variance of the IBNR reserve at any given time t thus is reduced to finding the first two moments of 5i (t). There are two cases to consider: t < 1 and t ;::: 1. The
first case is needed for incomplete accident years and seems rarely to
be addressed. Unfortunately, it is this case that usually will generate
the largest expected values of IBNR and, therefore, cannot be ignored.
Case I (t < 1): If a loss that occurs at time X is reported after time t,
it follows that X + Z > t. Thus 5i(t) and [5 I X + Z > t] are
equivalent random variables, i.e., they have the same probability
distribution. In other words,
adt)
a2(t)

E[5i(t)] = E[5 I X + Z > t]
= E[(5i(t))2] = E[5 2 I X + Z > t].

=

Now as X and 5 are independent, then

f;=o fz:t-x p(z)g(z)dz u(x)dx
f;=o f::t-x g(z)dz u(x)dx
a2 (t)

(1

=

L!=o fz:t-x p(z)g(z)dz u(x)dx
+ C 2) :=---'Ot--'-"'---"oo---'-'---'------=-----fx=o fz=t-x g(z)dz u(x)dx

(11)
(12)

Next, let Ij (t) denote the indicator random variable for the reporting of the jth claim after time t, i.e.,
Ij(t)

=

Clearly, N(t)

I
{ 0
=

if the jth claim is reported after time t;
otherwise.

L~~~l Ij(t), and

Pr[Ij(t) = 1] =

{=o t~t-x

g(z)dzu(x)dx.
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Hence, from Assumption 4, the lj(t)s are independent, so
E[N(O)]E[lj(t)]

,\(t)

'\(0)

(=0 L~t-x

g(z)dz u(x)dx.

(13)

Case II (t ;::: 1): Here the maximum value that x can take is one so,
f;=o fz':t-x j.1(z)g(z)dz u(x)dx

(14)

f;=o fz':t-x g(z)dz u(x)dx
a2(t)

(1

+ c 2) f;=o fz':t_x(j.1(Z))2 g (z)dz u(x)dx

(15)

f;=o fz':t-x g(z)dz u(x)dx

Again,
,\(t) = '\(0)

(=0 L~t-x

g(z)dz u(x)dx.

(16)

Note that in these equations, j.1(z) is given by equation (5) and u(x) = 1
for 0 ~ x ~ 1. Thus in order to estimate the mean and variance of IBNR
at any time t for a given accident year, one needs to know the density
g(z), overall mean severity j.1, conditional mean severities j.1(z), and
conditional coefficient of variation c.
If there is no trend across accident years and the conditional means
and severities apply to all accident years, then the aggregate expected
value of IBNR simply will be the sum of the IBNR, as calculated in this
paper, for each of the accident years. If there is trend across accident
years, but all other aspects of the model (e.g., parameters for 9 (z) and
c) are assumed to hold across accident years, one only need adjust
the value of j.1 for each accident year, calculate the model's expected
IBNR, and sum the results over the accident years. Although the model
assumes no trend by accident date within the accident year, the effect
of any trend on the calculated IBNR results is probably minimal and
safely can be ignored.
Finally, it may be necessary to have parameters that vary by accident year to reflect changes in the reporting lag distribution and/or the
conditional coefficient of variation to calculate expected IBNR in each
accident year and sum the results.
In all cases, the expected value of total IBNR is the sum of the expected values of the individual accident year expected values. Moreover, if one can assume independence of losses by accident year, the
variance of the aggregate IBNR will be the sum of the individual accident
year IBNR variances.
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4

An Application of the Model

An example using an actual data set will illustrate practical use of
this model. The data are loss counts and incurred losses by accident
year and report year for a group errors and omissions (E&O) program.
This program is selected because it is long-tailed and extremely volatile.
The basic data in Table 2 and Table 3 show the exposures, reported loss
counts, and reported losses for report years 1990-1993 on accident
years 1980-1993.

AY
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Totals

Table 2
Loss Counts by Report Year
Loss Counts
Exposed 1990 1991 1992 1993
0
2,599.9
0
0
0
0
2,473.3
0
0
0
2,597.6
1
0
0
0
2,646.7
0
0
0
0
2,537.0
0
0
0
0
2,673.4
0
0
0
0
2,911.6
0
1
0
0
3,055.2
1
0
1
0
2,810.8
4
2
0
2
1
3
25
2,887.2
6
2,907.6
47
46
9
2
2,922.6
40
64
3
3,018.1
26
50
41
3,034.2
73
39,075.2
76
120
106

Note: AY = Accident Year.

1990-93
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
2
8
35
104
107
76
41
375
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The first step is to determine the ultimate frequency and the density
function 9 (z) from the loss counts and exposures. There are many possible choices of the form of the density, and several are tried. Because
there are some claims with extremely long reporting lags, the two parameter Pareto is selected, truncated somewhat arbitrarily at 15 years.
Thus for 0 ::; z ::; 15,
g(z) =

01./3 IX (/3

+ Z)IX-l

..-L

for 01.,/3>0.

(17)

1-({3+1S)1X

AY
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Totals

Table 3
Loss Amounts (in $s) by Report Year
1991
1992
1993
1990
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
500
0
0
0
26,207
0
599
0
8,453
72,329
905
0
16,136
81,196
169,133
9,935
151,367
98,812
20,271
282,473
78,260
748,559
319,906
122,702
245,260
318,316
$405,319 $1,143,379 $677,909 $557,678

1989-93
0
0
5,000
0
0
0
500
26,806
81,687
276,400
552,923
1,146,725
367,962
318,316
$2,776,319

Note: AY = Accident Year.

Occurrences are assumed to be uniformly distributed, with no trend
in loss size. The parameters (01. and /3) and frequency i\ are determined
using discrete unweighted least squares with loss counts tabulated by
discrete lag n. If Ez is the exposure that underlies the counts observed
for lag n, the problem is to find the parameters i\, 01., and /3 that minimize the sum of squares L:
minL(i\, 01., /3)

=

IJi\Ezp(n) - N n )2
n

(18)
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where
A(O) is the ultimate annual claim frequency;
Report year - Accident year = the discrete lag;
Number of reported loss counts for lag n;
Associated exposure; and
Portion of ultimate loss counts reported for iag n.

A

n
Nn

En
p(n)

Note that p(n) is given by the equation:

_ { L~=o f;~+nl~,; g(z)dz u (x)dx
I
I-x
fx=O fz=o g(z)dz u(x)dx

if n *- 0;
if n = 0;

p (n ) -

The least squares estimated values are

A=

0.0315, &.

=

9.4274, and

S=

4.8475.

(19)

From equation (17), the estimated density 9 gives mean and variance
of Z as
(20)
m = 0.5752 and (= 0.4195.
The next step is to model severity of loss S, both globally and conditionally. A study of all reported mature losses results in the following
selected global mean and standard deviation:

p = 8,807 and if

=

28,637.

(21)

The severity by discrete lag is volatile due to a paucity of data. Most
counts are at discrete lag zero, however, so that value of J( is selected
for which the observed discrete lag zero severity would be reproduced,
Le., so that
7 894

,

=

L~=o f;':; (R(z - Fit) + {i)g(z)dz u(x)dx
flx=o fz=o
I-x
g(z)dz u (x)dx

This gives

R = 2,707.

(22)

Once R is known, the conditional coefficient of variation, C, is calculated
using equation (7). The model is now complete, and all of the quantities
of interest mentioned in this paper can be determined. For the sake
of brevity, however, only the development of the year end 1993 IBNR
expected value and standard deviation is shown as Table 4.
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Table 4
Year End 1993 IBNR Reserve Estimates
AY
Mean
Std. Dev.
$429,898
$222,206
1993
107,018
126,463
1992
76,055
1991
31,453
1990
10,997
48,984
4,303
1989
32,941
1,808
1988
22,730
1987
912
17,054
1986
428
12,255
202
8,791
1985
6,481
1984
102
5,027
1983
58
3,755
1982
30
15
2,691
1981
1,887
1980
7
1980-1993 $587,231
$275,253
Note: AY = Accident Year, and Std. Dev = Standard Deviation.

The importance of the value of K, which determines the slope of loss
sizes by lag, in the reserve estimates is illustrated by two alternative
calculations. If K = 0, the total IBNR reserve decreases from $ 587,231 to
$480,489. At the other extreme, fJ(O) = 0, and K = 15313.59 increases
the reserve to $1,084,335.
The actual fit of the model to the observed data, especially in the
case of loss size, is not of great importance, given the strong variation
in the observations. Moreover, the value of this example lies not in the
discovery of the true underlying forces operating on the development
of losses but in the illustration of the model concepts when applied to
the data. Table 5 does, however, give an indication of goodness of fit.

5

Some Closing Comments

The central loss development model described in this paper is designed to provide a logically consistent statistical approach to pure
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Discrete
Lag
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
ALL

Total
Exposed
11,882.5
11,735.5
11,528.2
11,660.8
11,664.8
11,451.0
11,177.2
10,768.7
10,454.7
10,254.6
10,317.5
7,670.8
5,073.2
2,599.9

Table 5
Goodness of Fit
Actual
Model
Actual
Dollars
County Counts
202 202.36 $1,594,608
675,171
137 136.01
23.75
354,658
20
5.51
128,742
10
1.52
17,041
3
1
0.48
599
1
0.17
500
0
0.06
0
1
0.03
5,000
0.01
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
375 369.91 $2,776,319

Model
Dollars
$1,597,632
1,246,532
284,644
81,421
26,678
9,749
3,920
1,548
856
313
340
0
0
0
$3,253,633

IBNR estimation. There are strong advantages to this approach, however, beyond logical consistency:
• The model allows for reserve valuation at any time t > O.
• The model can be used to estimate unreported future losses that
can be checked against actual future emergence of such losses
within a statistical framework. This is because the model not only
forecasts expected values but also the expected variation in such
losses.
• The model allows for the valuation of incomplete accident years.
Incomplete accident years pose a serious problem for traditional
claim run-off triangle methods.
There are still many basic unanswered questions about this model,
some of which lie primarily in the apparent arbitrariness of the assumptions that have been made. For example,
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• Do loss sizes increase by reporting lag? If so, is a linear model
appropriate? With modern hardware and software, the simplification of a linear model may not be necessary.
• Is it realistic to assume that the developments of loss counts and
loss sizes over time arising from a fixed accident period are mutually independent?
• How robust is the model? The whole question of model parameter
errors, which are critical pricing and reserving considerations for
estimating needed security margins, is ignored. I believe that the
model is sufficiently robust to be used when loss development is
highly volatile and the process variance 3 is expected to be large
enough to playa significant part in estimation of the reliability
of the expected value estimates of IBNR. The example given in
Section 4 illustrates this point.
It may be tempting to try to apply the concepts in this paper to the
claims-made environment, which is especially suited to the development of reported losses, for the estimation of claims-made pure premium components. This temptation may be particularly strong because
Marker and Mohl (1980) show that an occurrence basis pure premium
can be decomposed into a sum of claims-made components, with adjustment for differences in reporting patterns that arise from the two
coverage types. Moreover, McClenahan (1988) includes the cost of extended reporting tails as a component of the occurrence basis pure premium. This temptation, however, must be dampened severely by two
major considerations. First, claims-made coverages have arisen largely
out of concern for strong and unpredictable loss trends. Second, the
model is based on accident years, while the claims-made environment
is defined in terms of policy years. For these reasons, I somewhat reluctantly have overcome this temptation to produce nice formulations
3 As used by Herzog (1985), the term process variance refers to "the variance of the
frequency, severity, or aggregate claim amount of an individual combination of risk
characteristics," and is, therefore, a conditional variance. The context in Herzog is one
of a population consisting of a collection of different individual combinations of risk
characteristics, so that the total variance is the sum of (i) the expected value of process
variance, and (ii) the variance of the hypothetical means. Here, the context used for
the term process variance is somewhat different in that it refers to the total variance
arising from the model, but is also conditional upon the parameters employed in the
model. In this sense, the term process variance is employed analogously to the term
process risk. Variance arising from error in the selection of parameters (which is not
estimated in this paper) is analogous to parameter risk. (See McClenahan (1990, p. 61)
for definitions of process risk and parameter risk.)
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from the model using assumptions that will be unrealistic in most real
world situations.
I do suggest, however, that if one can devise a more general model
that incorporates trend, shifts in reporting patterns, and distributions
of policy inception dates, then Monte Carlo simulations may be used
to estimate both the expected values and the process variances needed
to determine IBNR reserves for occurrence basis coverages and claimsmade pure premiums without having to deal with extremely complex
mathematical formulae. With the powerful desktop computers and
commercial software readily available today, I believe firmly that practical results could be obtained at minimal cost.
SpeCific technical questions as to forms of distributions or functional ways in which loss sizes vary are wide open. This paper makes
no attempt to answer such questions. Rather, this paper is designed to
build a practical framework or approach for the practicing actuary to
develop his or her own model to produce IBNR estimates that can be
tested scientifically from emerging experience.
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There is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that ambiguity (i.e., parameter risk) impacts pricing decisions by actuaries and underwriters and their
desire to provide coverage. Stone proposed a safety first model of choice that
provides a possible explanation for this behavior. This paper analyzes Stone's
proposed stability and survival constraints and compares the results with those
predicted by expected utility theory. The analysis is motivated by insurers' increaSing reluctance to provide coverage for certain specific risks such as earthquake damage insurance where the probability of loss is ambiguous. We show
that such behavior is consistent with safety first but is difficult to explain using
an expected utility approach.
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Introduction

Stone (l973a, 1973b) put forward a behavioral theory of insurance
capacity in the spirit of a chance constrained/safety first model of
choice that still stands as a possible explanation for crises of availability in insurance markets. Stone proposes that constraints of stability
and survival are used by insurance companies for acceptance or rejection of risks, where stability means regularity in corporate profits over
time, and survival refers to the specification of a maximum probability
that aggregate losses exceed surplus.
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a more formal analysis of
these constraints and to compare the results to the predictions of expected utility theory. Short-run supply functions are derived that determine the lowest price that a firm will charge to protect a certain number
of risks against a particular event or, equivalently, how many risks the
firm will insure at a given price. The actual price that is observed will
reflect the demand for insurance. Our focus is on the first steps that
firms are likely to take before entering the marketplace.
In his analysis of insurer behavior Stone suggests that "second degree uncertainty" (also termed ambiguity) influences decisions on price
as well as whether a firm will want to offer coverage. Stone does not
specify how ambiguity would be incorporated in his model of choice,
however. In the last few years a literature on ambiguity has arisen
that addresses the issue of economic behavior when there is uncertainty over the parameters of probability distributions (Kunreuther,
1989; Kunreuther, Hogarth, and Meszaros 1993).
Of interest to us is the impact of ambiguity on the premium charged
by the firm and its desire to prm'ide coverage. Our analysis is motivated
by insurers' recent difficulties in providing coverage for specific risks
where the probability of a loss is ambiguous. For example, today insurers are reluctant to provide coverage to homeowners against earthquakes because of a concern that the losses from a catastrophic disaster
could create capacity problems and possibly cause insolvency. Hence,
the indllstry has argued for some type of federal earthquake insurance
program just as they did for flood coverage in the 1960s; for more on
this, see the Insurance Services Office (1994). As we shall demonstrate,
this lack of interest by private firms in providing protection is consistent with a safety first model of firm behavior, but is difficult to explain
using an expected utility approach.
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2 Safety First and Utility Theory
Suppose that an insurer is interested in offering one-period coverage for a group of n mutually independent risks. At the end of the
period, each risk is assumed to have a probability e of causing a loss of
fixed amount fl. (At this point e is assumed to be a known constant. I
In Section 3, however, we will consider the case where e is a random
variable.) The insurer's current surplus on hand, w, is assumed to be
known with certainty. In addition, the insurer is assumed to be risk
averse with a known continuous concave utility function.
Under traditional von Neumann-Morgenstern 2 expected utility pricing, the premium is set so the insurer is indifferent between taking the
risk or not. The pricing relation is given by
u(W) = E[uCw + nIT

-

X)]

(1)

where:
u(·)
IT

X

The insurer's utility function;
The insurance premium per risk; and
Aggregate losses for the n risks
Kxfl

where K is the actual number of losses.
Under Stone's model of safety first behavior, the premium is determined by constraints of stability and solvency. Expenses are ignored in
the analysis that follows. Stability requires a probability less than PI
that the loss ratio exceeds a certain target level r*. Specifically, if there
are n risks, the premium ITs required to satisfy the stability constraint
is given by
Kfl
(2)
Pr[-- > r*] < PI,
nITs

'Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by uppercase English or
Greek letters.
2Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) developed expected utility theory for use
when there is a process of decision making under uncertainty. Expected utility theory
has been used by actuaries since the 1960s; see, for example, Borch (1968). There are
many problems associated with expected utility theory, however, such as (i) the lack
of a unique utility function, (ii) the utility function, even if unique, may be unknown,
and (iii) the utility function may be concave in some areas and convex in other areas.
See, for example, Ramsay (1993, Section 3.2) for more on the problems associated with
expected utility theory.
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where K is the actual number of losses. Clearly K is binomially distributed with parameters nand e, i.e.,

(3)
The survival constraint relates aggregate losses for the risk in question to the current surplus plus premiums written. It requires that the
probability of insolvency be less than P2. The premium ITr required to
satisfy the survival constraint is given by:
Pr[Kf> w + nIT,-] < P2.

(4)

Because the safety first constraints do not always provide a definitive premium, it is necessary to include a profit criterion as part of a
pricing model. Stone indicates that insurers often specify a fixed profit
margin in making their pricing decisions. Let m represent the profit
margin for a given risk. If one uses the expected value of losses as a
reference point, then the profit criterion for any given risk would yield
premium ITe (ignoring expenses) given by:
ITe =

eP(l + m).

Of course, the premium may be higher than that implied by the profit
criterion because of the stability and solvency constraints.
The expected profit criterion coupled with the safety first constraints
form a supply function for insurance that relates required premiums to
the number of poliCies written. Figure 1 illustrates the prices required
under the safety first constraints. Here e = 0.10, m = 0.10,& = 1, and
r* = l.0, and the survival constraint is graphed for w = 0, 5, and 10.
The safety first probabilities are, respectively, Pi = 0.05, P2 = 0.0000l.
It is evident from Figure 1 that the magnitude of w is only important for
smaller values of n. For very small values of n (and for w greater than
zero) premiums will be determined by the stability constraint because
a relatively high premium is needed for the loss ratio to be less than
one with the required probability.
Figure 2 shows the supply function that results from the safety first
constraints with w = 10 that are graphed in Figure l. This supply
function is generated from three curves shown in Figure 1: (i) Stability,
(ii) Survival (w = 10), and (iii) Profit Objective. SpeCifically, the supply
function is determined as follows: For each value of n,
IT =

max {Stability, Survival, Profit Objective}.
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Figure 1
Premiums Under Safety First Constraints
With 8 = 0.10 and m = 0.10
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For the supply function n, the number of risks insured, is the quantity
supplied, and IT is the price per unit risk.
The supply function can be compared with that implied when the insurer sets premiums on the basis of expected utility. For an exponential
utility function
(5)

equation (1) implies
1=

Solving for

IT

±

k~O

e-A(nrr-k) (n)8 k (1 _ 8)n-k.

k

yields
1
i\

IT = -In(l

+ 8(e'\ -

1))

so that IT is independent of nand w. This property of exponential utility pricing, known as additivity, is desirable because the order in which
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Figure 2
Safety First Supply Function
= 0.10, W = 0.10, -I! = 1, r* = 1.0 and m = 0.10

0.3
0.28
0.26
,-..

~
'"--'

§

·s

0.24
0.22
0.2

0.18
(l)
~ 0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

Number of Risks, n
(Natural Log-Scale)
independent risks are taken do not affect the price of each risk. 3 This
property does not hold for logarithmic and quadratic utility functions.
We will show in the next section that for logarithmic and quadratic
utility functions, the premiums are practically constant, increasing very
slowly as n increases. Premiums will increase substantially with n under all of these utility functions, however, when there is ambiguity in
the probability distribution associated with lusses.

3 Ambiguity and Insurance Pricing
The literature on credibility theory provides the foundation for modeling the impact on premiums if there is ambiguity with respect to
the parameters of probability distributions; see, for example, Heilmann
3It is well-known that exponential utility yields premiums that are independent of
nand 1'1'; see Gerber (1979, Chapter 5).
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(1989) and Venter (1990) for more on credibility theory. Given the na-

ture of credibility theory, it has been long recognized that Bayesian
techniques can be utilized to replace the ad hoc formulae that actuaries have been using for pricing (Mayerson, 1964). Klugman (1992)
gives an excellent treatment of the application of Bayesian techniques
to credibility theory. Although research is being conducted on expected
utility premium principles (Goovaerts and Taylor, 1987) and credibility
theory, little work has been done on expected utility pricing under parameter uncertainty.4
In the literature on ambiguity, uncertainty over the parameters of
probability distributions often is characterized as disagreement among
experts. s In such situations, however, we may be able to use mixing
distributions G for parameters in modeling such uncertainty. A uniform
distribution, for instance, may depict a situation in which opinion is
spread evenly over a range of values. A discrete mixing distribution,
on the other hand, could be used to represent a case where there are
substantial differences of opinion and the experts have specific values
for the parameters. We will see that under extreme ambiguity insurers often will be unwilling to provide coverage at any price when they
are following safety first principles. This will not be the case under
expected utility pricing.
It is useful to contrast the concept of ambiguity, as defined in this
paper, with that of process risk which often is used to characterize uncertainty. Ambiguity (also called parameter risk) refers to uncertainty in
the parameters of the probability or outcome distribution, whereas process risk refers to the risk associated with the projection of future losses
which are inherently random. 7 Actuaries often use mixtures of distributions to model situations where parameters vary over a population;
see Panjer and Willmot (1992, Chapters 2.8 and 8). We are, however,
applying mixtures in a different way. The distribution of the parameter
now is used to characterize parameter risk. This approach differs from
Bayesian analYSis as there is no updating procedure; rather, the focus
is the degree of uncertainty about the true value of the parameter.
With ambiguity, e is the uncertain parameter in the speCification of
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) X, Fe(x). In this case, e is
4But see Freifelder (1976, 1979). Goovaerts, De Vylder, and Haezendonck (1984)
study the effect of parameter uncertainty on premium principles such as the Escher,
but not utility theory.
sFor example, in asseSSing risks such as underground storage tank, earthquake, and
satellite, the scientific community is divided due to the lack of data and causal models.
6The mixing distribution is the probability distribution of the uncertain parameter.
7This definition of process risk follows McClenahan (1990, page 61).
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viewed as a random variable with cdf G(8). Throughout the rest of this
paper, the probability distribution function (pdf) (if e is continuous) or
probability function (if e is discrete) of e is denoted by 9(8) = dG(8).
The pricing equation for expected utility theory is

+ nIT - X)] Ie]

Ee[E[u(w

U(w)

f:=-oo J:=o u(w + nIT - x)dFo(x) dG(8).

(6)

Because the mean of e is assumed to be a known constant, ambiguity
will not influence pricing under risk neutrality.
To contrast the differences between the effect of ambiguity on expected utility and safety first pricing we consider the same case discussed above where the firm is assumed to be insuring identical independent Bernoulli risks. The premium per risk, IT, as a function of n is
computed under the following conditions:
• No ambiguity;
• The uniform mixing distribution,
(e) =

91

f
l

1 for 0 :s; e :s; 1
0 otherwise;

• The discrete mixing distribution,
, (8)
92

=

S 0.5

l

for e = 0 or 1
0 otherwise.

Note that both 91 (8) and 92(8) yield E[e = 0.5].
Under each of the above conditions, we will use the exponential utility function defined in equation (5) and the following utility functions:
Ul(X)
uq(x)

In(201 + x) logarithmic: with x> -201; and
-(10 - X)2 quadratic: with -00 < x :s; 10.

(7)
(8)

Using equation (6), the expressions for the premiums can easily be calculated.
Table 1 depicts the resulting premiums for these different utility
functions and mixing distributions. Although the premium for exponential utility remains constant with no ambiguity, the fact that prf'miums increase as n increases for all of the mixing distributions means
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that additivity does not hold under parameter uncertainty. The premiums for the logarithmic utility function for the no ambiguity and uniform mixing distribution cases are determined by numerical methods.
As is the case for the exponential utility function, the premium under
ambiguity increases with 11. and is higher for the discrete than for the
uniform mixing distribution. The same results hold for the quadratic
utility function. For the discrete mixing distribution, the premiums are
higher than under the uniform mixing distribution due to the concentration of mass at probability zero and one. One interpretation of such
behavior is a split in expert opinion: one group believes an event is certain to occur, while another group believes it will not. If the event does
occur, all risks will suffer losses. This kind of extreme ambiguity, such
as that given by a discrete mixing distribution, thus translates into a
perfect correlation of risks.
Table 1
Premiums for E[8 = 0.5]
Mixing Distributions
NAB
Utility
11.
91 (8)
92(8)
Exponential
0.6200
0.6200
1 0.6200
0.8060
10 0.6200
0.9310
20 0.6200
0.8710
0.9650
0.9580
0.9930
100 0.6200
Logarithmic

1
10
20
100

0.5006
0.5006
0.5006
0.5006

0.5006
0.5025
0.5046
0.5212

0.5006
0.5062
0.5124
0.5613

Quadratic

1
10
20
100

0.5125
0.5126
0.5127
0.5134

0.51251
0.5513
0.6021

0.5125
0.6340
1.0000

Note: NAB

=

No Ambiguity.

In general, probability uncertainty introduces correlation into portfolios that otherwise would consist of independent risks if the value
of 8 were known. The relation between ambiguity and correlation is
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particularly clear when both the risks and the parameters are normally
distributed. In this case, if the normal mixing distribution for 8 has
variance T2 then the correlation between the risks is also T2 (Heilmann,
1989, p. 81). Thus, parameter uncertainty translates directly into correlation between risks that are conditionally independent.
Premiums under ambiguity are calculated in Table 2 using exponential utility and the safety first stability constraint. In each case we use
three different mixing distributions:
93(8)

94(8)

95(8)

{
{

5 for 0::0; 8 ::0; 0.2
0 otherwise;
0.5 for 8 = 0 or 0.2
0 otherwise;
0.9 for 8 = 0
0.1 for 8 = 1
0 otherwise.

{

For each of these three mixing distributions E[8]

=

0.1.

Table 2
Premiums for Exponential Utility and Safety First
Mixing Distributions
NAB 93(8) 94(8) 95 (8)
n
Exponential
1 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159
10 0.159 0.188 0.231 0.770
20 0.159 0.211 0.261 0.885
100 0.159 0.263 0.288 0.977
Safety First
(with stability
constraint)
Note: NAB

=

1
10
20
100

1.000
0.300
0.200
0.150

1.000
0.300
0.250
0.210

1.000
0.400
0.300
0.250

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

No Ambiguity.

For the exponential utility function defined in equation (5) and no
ambiguity, the insurer's premium is independent of the number of risks
and is given by IT = 0.159. Probability ambiguity causes premiums to
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increase rapidly as 11 increases. For the discrete mixing distribution
95(8), the premium is as high as 0.977 when 11 = 100.
For the safety first model the story is completely different, as indicated in Table 2. The premiums required under the stability constraint
given by equation (2) decline as n increases. In the most extreme case,
the discrete mixing distribution over [0,1], the constraint never can be
met because the probability of n losses is 0.10 and we have assumed
that PI = 0.05 in equation (2).
Table 3 shows the impact of the survival constraint (given by equation (4) with pz = 0.00001) on premiums for relatively small values of
n for the non-ambiguous case and when the probability distribution of
losses is ambiguous using 93. Consider the non-ambiguous case. In
order to understand how the firm's surplus and number of poliCies n
affect TTl', let
k(n) = min{k: Pr[K > k] < pz}.
(9)
Then for f

=

1,

w
n
Thus the insurer's current surplus on hand, w, can be viewed as a meaTTl' =

k(n)

max{O, - - - -}.

n

sure of its capacity to accept risks and has its greatest impact for small
values of n. Insurers with larger capacity are able to charge lower premiums. Note that as n increases (starting from 1), premiums may increase or decrease depending on the behavior of k(n)/n. But, from the
law of large numbers, k(n)/n goes to £[8] as n goes to infinity. So
the premium TTl' eventually will approach the expected loss. (See Figure
1.) Like the stability constraint, the required premiums increase under
this mixing distribution compared to the non-ambiguous case, but the
premiums also decline as the number of risks increases.
Thus a distinction emerges between the predictions of safety first
and utility theory under ambiguity. With extreme ambiguity, coverage
will be denied under the safety first criteria, while under more moderate
conditions premiUms will increase but eventually will decline for large
11. On the other hand, in utility theory, increased ambiguity results in
higher premiums and the failure of the law of large numbers to have
any influence as the number of risks increases.
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Table 3
Premiums (TTl')
Under Survival Constraint
No Ambiguity 93(0)
w
n
0.70
0
10
0.60
20
0.45
0.55
0.32
0.42
50
0.25
0.35
100
0.30
200
0.20
5

10
20
50
100
200

0.10
0.20
0.22
0.20
0.18

0.20
0.30
0.32
0.30
0.28

10

10
20
50
100
200

0.00
0.00
0.12
0.15
0.15

0.00
0.05
0.22
0.25
0.25

20

50
100
200

0.00
0.05
0.10

0.02
0.15
0.20
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Empirical Results

Hogarth and Kunreuther (1990) conducted a survey to test the various theories of insurance pricing. Actuaries were asked to price warranties on the performance of a component of a new line of microcomputers. They were told that the cost of repair is $100, and there can
be at most one breakdown per period. Experimental variations concern
the number of units insured, ambiguous and non-ambiguous probabilities of breakdown, and probability levels of 0.001, 0.01, and 0.10. In
the ambiguous versions of the scenario, respondents were told there
is considerable disagreement among experts regarding the probability
of a breakdown of any given unit, while in the non-ambiguous versions
they were told that the experts all agree on the chances of a breakdown.
The results are listed in Table 4 in terms of the ratios of the prices
proposed by the actuaries to the expected losses. It is evident in all
cases that ambiguity results in higher prices. What is difficult to explain, however, is that even in the absence of ambiguity, prices increase
as risks are added for e = 0.001 and e = 0.01 while they decline for
e = 0.10. Utility theory implies that premiums increase as risks are
added under decreasing absolute risk aversion, and premiums decline
under increasing absolute risk aversion (Goovaerts and Taylor, 1987;
see note 5). The above empirical results seem to suggest that the actuaries' utility functions exhibit decreasing and increasing absolute risk
aversion over the appropriate ranges.
Table 4
Actuaries' Price-Expected Loss Ratios for Warranties
e = 0.001 e = 0.01
e = 0.100
n= 10,000
Non -ambiguous
1.266
1.149
1.075
Ambiguous
2.439
1.587
1.370

n=

100,000
Non-ambiguous
Ambiguous

1.538
3.333

1.176
1.961

1.020
1.316

Source: Hogarth, R. and Kunreuther, H. "Risk, Ambiguity and Insurance."
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2 (1990): 5-35.
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It is possible, however, to explain the actuaries' pricing from the
perspective of safety first theory. We noted earlier that the premiums
implied by the survival constraint can rise for smaller values of n followed by declines. The observed patterns of pricing with no ambiguity
can be explained if premiums are increasing for 8 = 0.001 and 8 = 0.01
and decreasing for 8 = 0.10 over the range of n being considered.
Consider, for example, the results exhibited in Table 5 for w = 15.
For 8 = 0.001 prices peak at n = 40,000, while for 8 = 0.10 prices
decline over the entire range of values for n. When n increases from
10,000 to 100,000, prices thus increase for 8 = 0.001 and decline for
8 = 0.10. This occurs because the relative magnitude of the initial
surplus is higher for small values of 8. The capacity goes further for
smaller values of 8 and, therefore, the premiums rise for larger values
of n.

Table 5
Impact of Survival Constraint on Premiums
With w = 15 and Non-Ambiguous Risks
TT/8
TT
8 = 0.001 8 = 0.100
8 = 0.001 8 = 0.100
n
1.10
1.ll5
10,000
O.OOllO
0.lll5
1.35
1.084
20,000
0.00135
0.1084
0.1070
1.37
1.070
30,000
0.00137
40,000
0.00138
0.1061
1.38
1.061
50,000
0.1055
1.36
1.055
0.00136
60,000
0.1050
1.35
1.050
0.00135
1.33
1.046
70,000
0.00133
0.1046
0.1044
1.33
1.044
80,000
0.00133
1.31
90,000
0.00131
0.1041
1.041
1.30
1.039
0.00130
0.1039
100,000

The fact that for the survey of actuaries relative prices are higher
for smaller values of 8 is explained readily in the presence of expenses
that do not vary with the probability of loss.
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5 Coverage Limits
The consideration of ambiguity can shed light on another question
of interest. The fact that insurance companies offer liability policies
with specified coverage limits is a puzzle from the perspective of utility theory. Models of risk sharing under expected utility maximization
invariably conclude that the entire risk should be split according to the
risk preferences of the parties to the exchange. The optimal contractual
forms do not include coverage limits but involve deductibles and coinsurance above some level. Only in the case of a regulatory constraint
requiring insurers to sell a policy with a prescribed actuarial value has
it been shown that there will be policy limits (Raviv, 1979). Huberman,
Mayers, and Smith (1983) derive coverage limits when demand is influenced by limited liability under speCific assumptions about the nature
of the risk, but this does not explain insurers' reluctance to offer policies with unlimited exposure. In fact, consideration of limited liability
of insurers would suggest that they would be more than willing to sell
such poliCies if there were relatively low costs of bankruptcy.
The above analysis assumes a fixed loss size of one, but it easily is
extended to a severity of loss sizee. The survival constraint may be
written as
IV
(10)
Pr[K ~ 7 + nIT] ::s; 0.00001,
where IT is now the premium per dollar of coverage. Note that capacity
is now IV II! instead of IV. As I! increases, capacity approaches zero,
which limits the ability of firms to write small numbers of large risks.
In this case the supply function with IV = 0 in Figure 1 is an appropriate
representation of the insurer's ability to provide coverage.
Large values of I! together with ambiguity further will act to raise
prices and limit availability. From equations (10) and (9),

ken)
IV
IT-----,
- n

ne

(11)

so for large I! the ratio k(n)ln becomes the key determinant of price.
In the absence of ambiguity k (n) I n will approach 8 (recall that 8 is

known) as n gets large. This is generally not the case when ambiguity
is present. For example, when E[8] = 0.5
• Under the uniform mixing distribution, the probability of all outcomes is 1/(n + 1), i.e.,
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1

Pr[K = k] =

r
Jo

(n)ek(l_ e)l1-kde
k

Hence the limit of k(n)/n as n

~

00

=

_1_.

n+1

is 1;

• When the ambiguity is characterized by the discrete mixing distribution over the [0, 1] interval, the probability of n losses is e,
so unless nil :5 w + nf.IT the survival constraint always will be
violated for e > 0.00001. Therefore, the law of large numbers is
ineffective in cases such as these. Hence, only a relatively small
number of risks m?y be underwritten.
Contrast these observations with the case of no ambiguity and independent risks: for e = 0.1 the number of risks n need only be six for
the probability of n losses to be less than 0.00001.
The company has three alternatives in meeting the survival constraint under extreme ambiguity-it can reduce n, raise IT, or reduce f.
Solving the constraint ni!:5 w + nfIT for n, we get n:5 w/((l-IT)-e).
In general, the constraint on the number of risks will be

w
n

:5

(k(l1) _ IT)!:"
n

With ambiguity, k(n)/n will be close to one for small values of n, so
the same analysis goes through under these conditions. This means
that the capacity w relative to the severity f determines how many
risks can be underwritten. A natural way to increase the number of
risks that can be underwritten is to reduce f by way of coverage limits.
Capacity also is increased by increasing IT, but IT cannot get too close
to one, especially when expenses are considered. When the constraint
is reached, nf = w + nfIT and the capacity to assume new risks is
exhausted. In order to assume a new risk, the premium collected must
be increased 100 cents to the dollars in order to prevent violation of
the constraint; that is, IT must approach one and the insurance will not
be purchased.
We see that ambiguity and safety first results in a focus on the worst
possible outcome (nf) that a portfolio of risks may suffer. Empirical studies of managerial behavior in the face of uncertainty suggest
that managers do tend to focus on the severity of the worst possible
BSee Kunreuther (1989) for an interview with an actuary who uses this expression
to explain his reaction to extre-me ambiguity.
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outcomes, paying less attention to the probability of their occurrence
(March and Shapira, 1987, p. 1407). Not only does this describe managerial behavior, but such a focus is prescribed by the leading texts on
risk management (e.g., Williams and Heins, 1989; Vaughan, 1992). Risk
management procedures call for prioritizing risks according to their
potential severity followed by an estimation of the probability of their
occurrence. The ambiguity inherent in many organizational risks calls
for a managerial focus on potentially catastrophic risks regardless of
the probability of their occurrence.

6

Discussion

The safety first model of insurance pricing has been shown to provide significantly different predictions from those of expected utility
theory. While the utility functions (exponential, quadratic and logarithmic) examined here exhibit nondecreasing premiums as risks are added
to the portfolio, under a safety first model premiums may increase or
decline for small values of n according to the predominance of the survival or stability constraints. Under safety first, the value of IT declines
as the number of insured risks becomes relatively large.
When ambiguity is present, price increases are exaggerated under
utility theory, whereas for safety first the results depend on the extent
of the ambiguity. Under extreme ambiguity insurers often will be reluctant to provide coverage at any price except dollar-for-dollar, while
for more moderate ambiguity, premiums will be higher even though
they eventually may decline. Safety first theory also has been shown
to yield a definition of capacity as referring to the ability to underwrite
relatively small numbers of risks and to provide explanations for the existence of coverage limits in liability insurance. It appears that Stone's
characterization of insurer behavior has considerable merit.
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Discussion of Robert L. Brown's "Tax Assistance to
Qualified Retirement Savings Plans: Deferral or
Waiver"*
Mark W. Campbell t

Abstract
In the paper entitled "Tax Assistance to Qualified Retirement Savings Plans:
Deferral or Waiver," Robert L. Brown concludes that "the nontaxation of investment income on qualified funds until taken is a tax waiver or tax subsidy from
the government to participants of qualified plans". I believe, however, that this
conclusion is based on flawed assumptions pertaining to:
• The behavioral responses of taxpayers to the withdrawal of such tax assistance;
• The definition of an appropriate benchmark tax system against which to
measure the cost of such tax assistance; and
• The appropriate basis of comparison of alternative government tax revenue streams.
Using alternative and reasonable assumptions, I conclude instead that the nontaxation of investment income on qualified plans until taken provides gains to
government and taxpayers alike.
Key words and phrases: behavioral response, benchmark tax. system
*Robert L. Brown's article "Tax Assistance to Qualified Retirement Savings Plans:
Deferral or Waiver?" appeared in Journal of Actuarial Practice, Volume 2, No. I, 1994:
159-166.
tMark W. Campbell, F.S.A., F.C.I.A., is a consultant in the Towers Perrin Calgary office
in Canada. He holds a B.Sc. (Statistics) degree from the University of Victoria, Canada,
and an M.sc. (Statistics) degree from the University of Calgary. He specializes in the
deSign, financing, and administration of employer-sponsored pension plans.
Mr. Campbell's address is: Towers Perrin, 3700 150-6 Avenue S.W., Calgary Alberta
T2P 3Y7, CANADA
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Introduction
In Section 2 of his paper entitled "Tax Assistance to Qualified Retirement Savings Plans: Deferral or Waiver," Robert L. Brown states that
certain assumptions have been made to "simplify the presentation".
Professor Brown then concludes, at the end of his paper, that "the nontaxation of investment income on qualified funds until taken is a tax
waiver or tax subsidy from the government to participants of qualified
plans". In fact, these assumptions are the only reason that the stated
conclusion is reached. Using other reasonable assumptions, completely
different conclusions are possible.
My discussion of Professor Brown's paper considers several mitigating factors and does the following:
• Highlights selected assumptions made by the author;
• Presents alternative assumptions; and
• Reaches different conclusions based on the alternative assumptions.
Unless otherwise specified, when an alternative assumption is used below, it is the only aspect of the author's analysis that has been changed.
At the end of this discussion, however, the combined effect of changing
several assumptions at once is considered.
Some, but not all, of the ideas contained in this discussion are borrowed from Section 5 and Appendix B of the document "Troubled Tomorrows-The Report of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries' Task Force
on Retirement Savings". This document was published in January 1995
and provides a more thorough treatment of the main topic addressed
by the author (as well as other interesting and related matters).l

2 Alternative Assumptions
2.1

Lack of Behavioral Response-Save or Spend?

The author assumes that if tax assistance were not provided, taxpayers would save just as much outside the retirement savings system
as they now save within it. Another possible response, albeit extreme,
ITo obtain a copy of "Troubled Tomorrows ... ", write to: Canadian Institute of Actuaries, Constitution Square, 360 Albert, Suite 820, Ottawa ON KIR 7X7, CANADA.
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is that taxpayers would spend the money they now devote to retirement savings. In this case, there would appear to be no tax subsidy
associated with the present system, as shown below.
The amount of taxes received at time t = 30 by the government if
the taxpayer saves in a qualified vehicle is:
Tax

$2,000.00 x (1.07)30 x 0.40
$6,089.80.

(1)

If, during the past thirty years, the taxpayer spends the amount that
would have been his or her retirement savings, the accumulated value
of the taxes received by government is exactly the same as is given in
equation (1), $6,089.80. The calculations are identical.

2.2

Lack of Behavioral Response-How to Invest?

The author further assumes that if tax assistance were not provided, taxpayers would invest their nonsheltered savings in a manner
that exposes them to the full brunt of the current tax system. In reality, taxpayers are likely to make investments with advantageous tax
characteristics.
In Canada, a good example is paying down a home mortgage. Because mortgage interest is not tax deductible and resale gains are not
taxable, this is tantamount to earning a tax-free rate of return on the
extra mortgage payment(s). If all retirement savings could be so redirected, the only tax revenue that government would receive is with respect to the initial contribution of $2,000. Thus, we would again have
no apparent subsidy in the current tax system.

2.3

Definition of Benchmark Tax System

The author assumes that the cost of tax assistance should be measured by assuming that the benchmark tax system is the current tax system minus the existing qualified plan exemptions. Unfortunately, the
current tax system treats any savings other than qualified retirement
savings punitively. Specifically, most investment income, whether real
or not, is fully taxed.
This is proof of the adage that we should never let government forget
whose income it is in the first place. Although the retirement savings
system allows us to keep some of our investment income, this does not
mean that the amount so kept is a gift from a beneficent government.
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Consider instead a benchmark tax system where only real investment income is taxed. Repeating the author's arithmetic, but with this
modification, we get the following (an inflation rate of 4 percent has
been assumed for illustrative purposes, i.e., real rate of return is 3 percent).
Qualified Vehicle: The amount of taxes received by government at time
t = 30 if the taxpayer saves in a qualified vehicle is $6,089.80.
Non-Qualified Vehicle: The accumulated value to time t = 30 of the
amount of taxes received by the government if the taxpayer saves
what would have been his or her retirement savings, but outside
a qualified vehicle, is:
Tax

=

$2,000.00 x 0.40 X (1.07)30
+ $2,000.00 x (1 - 0.40) x 0.40 x 0.03
29

x

L (1.07 -

0.03 x 0.40)k(1.07)29-k

k=O

$6,089.80 + $2,622.16
$8,711.96.

(2)

The apparent tax subsidy is still substantial, but much less than the
amount calculated by the author.

2.4

Basis of Comparison of Tax Revenue Streams

The author has assumed that government's different tax revenue
streams should be accumulated at the same interest rate as the taxpayer can invest. No rationale is offered for this chOice, but as with the
foregOing assumptions, it is crucial.
The rationale likely is connected somehow to the government's cost
of borrowing. That is, the underlying presumption is that if government defers the collection of tax, then it must borrow the foregone
amount until the tax eventually is collected. Governments, however,
need not borrow the amount of taxes they defer. A more prudent approach would be to defer spending until such time as the tax to warrant
the spending is collected.
It is well-known that governments in both Canada and the U.s. are
highly indebted. The high cost of servicing this debt should not necessarily be attributed to the retirement savings system. Imagine for
a moment that no government debt or deficits existed. Then the real
choice easily would be seen to be:
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Tax now, spend now
OR

Tax later, spend later.
The fact that past governments have chosen to spend now and tax
later should not influence unduly a theoretical paper such as that of
the author unduly. Thus, I suggest that a better approach would be
to compare tax revenue streams using an inflation-adjusted approach
rather than an interest-adjusted approach.
Applying this logic to the author's original analysis yields the following (again, a 4 percent inflation assumption has been used):
• The amount of taxes received by government at time t = 30 if the
taxpayer saves in a qualified vehicle again is given by equation (1),
$6,089.80 .
• The accumulated value of taxes received by government to time
t = 30 if the taxpayer continues to invest what would have been
his or her retirement savings, but outside a qualified vehicle, is:
Tax

=

$2,000.00 x 0.40 x 1.0430
+ $2,000.00 x (l - 0.40) x 0.40 x 0.07
29

x

2: (l.07 - 0.07 x 0.40)k(1.04)29-k
k=O

$2,594.72 + $3,232.85
$5,827.57.

(3)

Now the tables are turned. If the government patiently can defer taxation, it will receive more tax dollars later.

3 Redrawing the Picture
Reality is messy. Perhaps the right answer involves a compromise
between the author's assumptions and those presented in this discussion. Even a modest amount of such blending would temper the author's conclusion. If the inflation-adjusted approach to comparing tax
revenue streams is accepted, then the author's conclusion is reversed. I
conclude, however, that the nontaxation of investment income on qualified plans until taken provides gains to government and taxpayers alike.
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"Tax Assistance to Qualified Retirement Savings
Plans: Deferral or Waiver": Author's Reply to
Previous the Discussion*
Robert L. Brown t
I greatly appreciate the fact that Mr. Mark Campbell has drawn
attention to the recent Canadian Institute of Actuaries paper entitled:
Troubled Tomorrows- The Report of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries'
Task Force on Retirement Savings. As a member of the task force and
one of the authors of the report, I am proud of its quality.
This report points out correctly that the present tax system in both
Canada and the United States discourages saving, including saving for
retirement. This is because the present tax system taxes the inflation
component of any gross rate of return on savings. In this way, the
present tax system is confiscatory.
The report then shows that the present tax system does not tax the
inflation component of qualified (in Canada, registered) retirement savings. In fact, that is the key tax advantage of such savings. The report
proves that if the inflation element of savings were not taxed, then the
only tax advantage of qualified (registered) savings would be tax deferral. That is, the only permanent advantage or subsidy of qualified
(registered) retirement savings is the nontaxation of the inflation element of its gross investment income.
*Robert L. Brown's article "Tax Assistance to Qualified Retirement Savings Plans:
Deferral or Waiver?" appeared in Journal or Actuarial Practice 2, no. 1, (1994): 159166.
tRobert L. Brown, F.C.I.A., F.S.A., A.C.A.S., is Professor of Statistics and Actuarial Sci·
ence and director of the Institute of Insurance and Pension Research at the University
of Waterloo. He is a past president of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries and is currently on the Society of Actuaries' Board of Governors and Executive Committee. He
is also an elected Councillor in the City of Waterloo. Professor Brown has authored
several articles and books.
Professor Brown's address is: Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo,Waterloo ON N21 3Gl, CANADA. Internet address:
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The report correctly points out that if these tax advantages were
removed by the government, then taxpayers/savers would make different decisions as to the mix of consumption/savings with their scarce
dollars. At the present time, the Canadian government states that the
tax expenditure associated with the tax deferral and nontaxation of the
inflation component of savings, given only to registered plans, totals
$14.9 billion (in 1991). Obviously, that amount of money would never
be realized if the government changed the tax regime and decreased or
removed the present advantages offered to registered plans. The report
goes through a believable set of assumptions as to how taxpayers may
respond to the removal of these tax advantages and concludes that the
government may only be losing $4.0 billion to $5.3 billion because of
the use of registered plans.
Mr. Campbell, under a different set of assumptions (namely that
there are no government deficits, and that the government only spends
money after it has been raised) shows that qualified (registered) savings
plans then actually would be beneficial to the government's coffers.
This conclusion is intuitively obvious. If the government charges a
constant tax rate (e.g. 40 percent) and the economy is growing in real
terms (Le., after inflation), then the government can expect more tax
revenue next year than it got this year.
None of this changes the fact that under today's tax system (which is
confiscatory) and under realistic assumptions as to gross and net (after
inflation) rates of return, that there is a permanent (Le., not just tax
deferral) tax advantage to using qualified (registered) savings plans.
In that regard, it is both dangerous and misleading for pension experts to state that the tax advantages associated with qualified (registered) funds are only advantages of deferral. This often is stated,
however, and was the cause and purpose of my paper.

